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ABSTRACT

How are Electric Utilities Responding to the Impact of Renewables?
Exploring an Integrative Approach to Ambidextrous Business Behavior

By

Robert Thomas Casey, Jr.
April 20, 2015
Committee Chair: Dr. Karen Loch
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business

In the U.S., clean energy goals and the move towards a clean energy economy are
causing the electric power sector to add emerging and innovative renewable energy resources
into their generation mix. Electric utilities (EU) face a monumental challenge to create, deliver,
and capture value from emerging and disruptive technologies. This study seeks to address the
impact of solar photovoltaics on the EU market by investigating the role of business model
changes within the domain of urban and rural U.S. electric utility organizations. By integrating
the evolving EU business model with the Competing Values Framework (CVF), a new lens is
created to assess the changing and evolving business behavior within the EU industry.
Furthermore, a predictive and prescriptive tool emerges associated with organizational
ambidexterity (OA). Finally, four lessons are presented that will help EU leaders become more
anticipatory, adaptable, and responsive in this changing renewable environment.

xiv

I

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing that examined the
state of technological innovation related to the electric industry. Senator Lisa Murkowski (RAlaska), chairman of the committee, stated that “a combination of market forces, technological
innovation, and policy directives at both the federal and the state levels could well result in an
unprecedented transformation of the electricity sector" (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, March 2015). This transformation is not just a U.S. phenomenon but across
the globe the electric power sector has added emerging and innovative renewable energy
resources into their electric power generation mix to fight climate change and resource depletion.
Electric utilities (EU) in the U.S. are now faced with a challenge of negotiating, managing, and
responding to emerging and disruptive renewable technologies.

The U.S. electric power industry has three types of EU service providers: 1) investor-owned
utilities, 2) electric cooperatives, and 3) municipal electric utilities. Since investor-owned electric
utilities (IOU) serve more than two-thirds of the urban U.S. population and electric cooperatives
(Co-op) serve about three quarters of the U.S. landmass they were included in this study. IOUs
and Co-ops have significant structural and operational differences. An IOU is a privately-owned
electric utility whose stock is publicly traded, is cost-of-service regulated by the state and is
authorized to achieve an allowed rate-of-return. A Co-op is a private, not-for-profit business
governed by their consumers and generally exempt from Federal income tax laws. Federal
guidelines require that all Co-ops have democratic governance and operate at cost. Consumers
elect local boards that oversee the Co-op which must return revenue above what is needed for
operation to the consumer. A Co-op generates, transmits, and/or distributes supplies of electric
energy to a specified area not being serviced by another utility. Most electric cooperatives were
1

initially financed by the Rural Utilities Service and typically serve rural America (U.S. EIA,
2014). Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of both types of EUs.
Table 1 IOU and Co-op Characteristics
Investor-owned Electric Utilities (IOU)

Electric Cooperatives (Co-op)

1. Fiduciary obligation to earn as large a
margin as possible.

1. Non-profit institutions run by the
customers that the Co-op region serves.

2. Take advantage of accelerated depreciation
and investment tax credits.

2. Exempt from state regulations and Federal
income tax.

3. Serve more than two-thirds of the US
population.

3. Federal and regional governments
contribute management expertise, financial
support, and grants to promote agriculture
and to allow service to rural America.

4. Subject to different regulations than
publicly-owned utilities and Co-ops.

4. Acquisition of actual energy and ancillary
services are performed to reduce cost.

5. Average of 2,200 employees and 315,000
consumers per IOU.

5. Average of 57 employees and 10,000
consumers per Co-op. Co-ops cover three
quarters of U.S. landmass.

IOUs and Co-ops have been slow to change in the last 35 years. However, IOUs and Co-ops
have recently witnessed an ever-growing and continuous pressure to change due to the disruptive
technology of solar energy. A 2013 report from the Edison Electric Institute shows the degree of
impact of these disruptive forces and proposes a possible electric utility death spiral due to
decreases in solar PV cost, increases in regulatory environment pressure, and changes in
customer behavior due to government incentive programs (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Electric Utility Disruptive Innovation (Solar Energy)

As technological and economic changes challenge and transform the EU business model,
model these
changes (or “disruptive challenges”) arise due to a convergence of factors
factors:
“…falling
falling costs of distributed solar generation and other distributed energy resources
(DER); increasing customer, regulatory
regulatory, ...government environmental programs to
encourage selected technologies; the declining price of natural gas; slowing economic
growth trends; and rising electricity prices in certain areas of the country.”
country (EEI, 2013)

Decreases in sales growth create a downward cycle which is driven by disruptive forces.
forces This
decrease in revenue causes EUs to raise rates to cover fixed costs, thereby prompting customers
to consider the further implementation of alternative ttechnologies. Therefore,
refore, the threat to the
centralized EU business model is very likely to come from these new solar photovoltaic
technologies and the related customer behavioral changes that reduce electrical load. (EEI,
(
2013)
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The purpose of this study is to consider the effects of solar photovoltaics on the EU market.
Specifically, it investigates the role of EU business model changes within the domain of IOU
(urban) and Co-op (rural) U.S. electric utility organizations. By using an integrative approach
with Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff, and Thakor’s (2006) Competing Values Framework (CVF) and
Richter’s (2011) EU business model, an assessment can be made to understand how IOUs and
Co-ops have changed between 2009 and 2014. Through this assessment, a predictive and
prescriptive tool emerges that enables EU leaders to interpret to what extent they have shown
ambidextrous behaviors to embrace solar energy and how they can become more anticipatory,
adaptable, and responsive to a shifting environment.

The two research questions to be addressed in this study are: 1) How have EUs responded to a
shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology? and 2) What
are the discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investorowned (urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar
technology?
I.1

Electric Utility Background

To better grasp and respond to what is happening in their environments, IOUs and Co-ops use an
integrated resource planning (IRP) process which evaluates the costs and benefits of both
demand-side and supply-side resources to develop the least total-cost mix of electric utility
resource options over a twenty-year period (U.S. Department of Energy).
The Tri-State Generation and Transmission Co-op in Colorado, which serves 18 distribution Coops with generation and transmission resources, says the IRP has become a formal process
prescribed by law in some states as a result of some provisions of the Clean Air Act amendments
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of 1992 (Tri-State IRP, 2010). This process is a critical tool for balancing the ability to see new
opportunities while maintaining a focus on current operating advantages. An IRP is typically
submitted every three years by the EU to the state’s Public Service Commission (PSC) for
approval (GPC IRP, 2013). The IRP is like organizational radar, allowing decision-makers to
develop an early warning system for potentially devastating disruptive technologies, third-party
competitor developments, and other electric utility industry shifts.

Some state IRP rules have remained unchanged since they were first implemented; other states
have amended, repealed, and in some cases reinstated their IRP rules. Rules that have been
amended often reflect current concerns in the electric industry such as fuel costs and volatility,
the effects of power generation on air and water, issues of national security, electricity market
conditions, and climate change, as well as individual state concerns. At Georgia Power
Company, the 2013 IRP results were formulated by using multiple scenario planning cases which
evaluated the impacts of three different fuel price views and three different carbon/renewable
generation views (GPC IRP, 2013). Co-ops typically propose a 15 year resource planning
process that is revised every 5 years. Co-ops are not regulated by the state PSC and therefore are
not required to submit a long-term resource plan for approval.
Both the IOU and Co-op are being impacted by the emergence of solar PV which has been
triggered primarily by two pieces of federal legislation. The first piece of legislation, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), is an economic stimulus package
enacted by the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and signed into law on February
17, 2009, by President Barack Obama (Pub. L. 111–5). The ARRA (Figure 2) is an $800 billion
economic stimulus package aimed at job creation and the promotion of investment and consumer
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spending. This act allocated $4.3B in tax credits to homeowners for energy efficiency
improvements (2009 - 2010 extended to 2016), $21.5B for energy infrastructure, and $27.2B for
energy efficiency and renewable energy research and investment. The second piece of
legislation, under the Clean Air Act (CAA), is President Obama’s Climate Action Plan (CAP)
which includes two sections: Section 111(d) commonly called the Clean Power Plan (CPP) and
Section 111(b) commonly called the Carbon Pollution Standards (CPS). How did these two
pieces of legislation trigger the growth of solar energy use and technology?

President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which encourages use of renewables and is supported
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has been introduced in three stages. The
plan first proposed cutting carbon pollution from new and existing power plants by creating
targets for fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions and mandated that CO2 emitted from fossil-fuel
based generation must be reduced by 30 percent by 2030 as compared to 2005 levels. Current
proposals include a specific emission reduction target for year 2030 for each state with a one
year deadline for an implementation plan to meet the targets. The EPA CAA Fact Sheet (U.S.
EPA) shows these milestones:
1. January 2013, EPA proposed standards to limit carbon pollution from new power plants.
2. June 2014, EPA proposed the CPP to limit carbon pollution from existing power plants.
3. June 2015, EPA plans to propose a federal plan to meet CPP goals for comment.
4. June 2016, proposed due date for states to submit compliance plans to EPA.
5. June 2020, proposed beginning of the CPP compliance period.

The CAA proposes to let states meet emission targets for power plants through plant upgrades,
by switching from coal to natural gas, and by improving energy efficiency or promoting
renewable energy. Many industry groups are insisting that the EPA limit itself to more modest
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efficiency gains that could be made in power plants alone lest energy rates increase dramatically
across the nation. According to the ruling, if a state does not develop an effective implementation
plan, the EPA can impose a federal plan (U.S. EPA, 2015).
Due to these regulatory changes, the emergence of solar PV energy is becoming a disruptive
force in the EU utility-side grid business model landscape.

1995: (Bush's Energy Policy Act)
Opened access to transmission networks to
non-utility generators. EPACT led states which
had historically high electricity prices to
investigate whether competitive deregulated
markets would benefit their consumers.
California and Rhode Island passed
deregulation legislation, giving the consumer
the right to choose his electricity supplier.
1947 to 1973: Annual growth rate
at 8% per year and little change in
the industry structure.

1920

1930

1940

1933: FDR New Deal era regulatory
(PUHCA) intervention into the electric
industry led to four service providers:
1) Investor-owned utilities
2) Publicly owned utilities
3) Cooperative utilities
4) Federal electric utilities (TVA)

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

1973: (OPEC oil embargo) - Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Introduced
competition and encouraged efficient use of
fossil fuels by allowing non-utility generators to
enter the wholesale power market
(cogenerators; and independent power
producers (IPPs), which use renewable resources
as their primary energy source.

2005: (Energy Policy Act)
Offers tax benefits to
individuals who increase energy
efficiency in existing homes,
buy or lease hybrid/alternative
vehicles. Required all public
utilities to offer net metering on
request.

2000

2010

2012

2014: EPA rule to
reduce the amount
of carbon dioxide
emitted from
fossil-fuel based
generation by 30
percent by 2030
compared to 2005
levels. The rule sets
emission reduction
goals for each state
and gives states
the flexibility to
choose how to
meet the goal.

2014

2009: (American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act): A $800 billion economic stimulus
package aimed at job creation and the
promotion of investment and consumer
spending. Included $4.3b in tax credits to
homeowners for energy efficiency
improvements in 2009-2010, $21.5b for
energy infrastructure, $27.2b for energy
efficiency and renewable energy research and
investment, etc.

Figure 2 Evolution of the Electric Utility Industry Regulatory Environment

I.2

Disruptive Innovations

Disruptive technological innovations disturb the established trajectory of performance
improvement and often destroy the value of existing competencies (Tushman & Anderson,
1986). A major characteristic of disruptive technologies is that they are rarely directly employed
7

in established markets, but instead change the architecture of the market in the medium and long
term (Christensen & Bower, 1996).

The theory of disruptive technological change provides insight into the impact of different
renewable energy technologies for electric utilities:
1) Disruptive technologies generally “create entirely new markets through the introduction
of a new kind of product or service” (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000, p.72).
2) The concept of “architectural” (Henderson & Clark, 1990) or “integrative” (O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2004) innovations recognize the fact that many innovations do not require
breakthrough technology to have major disruptive impacts on markets. These
architectural innovations essentially take core technologies and ideas that already exist
and combine them in new and novel ways to achieve an innovation that is greater than
the proverbial sum of its parts (Henderson & Clark, 1990; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004).

This author believes that distributed solar energy is both an architectural innovation and a new
market technology based upon the industry reaction to the disruptive impact on the vertically
integrated EU business model. Solar panel architecture (customer-side designs) allows electric
energy to be produced and then used where the consumer load is located reducing the need for
the electric grid and lowering the requirements for large EU resources. It can also be argued that
third-party customer-side solar leasing systems meet the criterion of creating “new markets” as
witnessed by the emergence of numerous companies offering leasing options to homeowners.
Finally, the emergence of new products and services that support these designs also constitute a
new market.
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theory elaboration entails the application of new concepts borrowed from other theoretical
perspectives to explain the focal phenomena (Braxton et al., 1997; Thornberry, 1989). This
qualitative research uses theory elaboration to draw on, extend, and organize important ideas
from EU Business Model changes and OA behaviors in response to the challenges introduced by
the emergence of solar PV. The goals of this study are 1) to develop an integrative approach to
assess EU business model changes to understand how IOUs and Co-ops have changed between
2009 and 2014 and 2) to develop a predictive and prescriptive tool that allows EU leaders to
interpret to what extent they have shown ambidextrous behaviors in embracing solar energy and
to determine how they can become more anticipatory, adaptable, and responsive in a shifting
environment.

II.1 EU Business Model
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2009: 14) explain a business model as “the rationale of how an
organization creates, delivers, and captures value”. A business model also functions as a valuable
tool for analysis and management in engaged scholarship (Zott & Amit, 2008) and as an
organizational tool to build comprehensive groupings to help understand business phenomena
(Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). As an organizational decision making tool, the business model
concept also helps executives and managers develop techniques to plan, design, construct,
operate, change, and interpret their business (Wirtz et al., 2010). Richter (2011) states that many
definitions of an EU business model encompass four basic elements: the value proposition, the
customer interface, the infrastructure, and the revenue model. Richter’s (2011) EU business
model is used in this study as a structural template to describe the organizational composition
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(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002) and to examine, compare, and contrast EU companies in a
structured manner.

The Richter (2011) EU model contains two “sides”: the utility-side and the customer-side, which
are analyzed throughout this study. A utility-side solar array encompasses a large scale project
with capacity between two and a few hundred megawatts. For example, a typical 30 megawatt
solar array requires approximately 200 acres of property and a connection to the transmission
grid for operation. The value to the EU is bulk generation of electricity; electricity is fed into the
grid and delivered to the customer in the traditional manner of coal, gas, and nuclear power
plants. Just as Teece (2010) describes, the utility-side generation business model describes how
EU organizations deliver value to customers and investors at a reduced cost, attracting
consumers to pay for that lower cost value, and then transforming the revenue into a profit or
service.

The second model is the customer-side distributed solar photovoltaics (PV) generation (roof-top)
installation. A roof-top installation is typically attached to a residential or commercial facility
close to the point of consumption. A building can be completely supplied with electricity to the
point that it is “net-metered”. Net-metering (NEM) allows electricity customers who wish to
supply their own electricity from on-site generation to pay only for the net energy they obtain
from the utility. PV systems can at times export excess power to the grid which is then credited
to the consumer’s bill. The possible value of solar PV to the EU would be providing a full
service package that includes financial solar panel leasing and maintenance, energy consulting
services, and net-metering. Richter (2013) states that EUs in Germany believe distributed solar
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PV generation has no value chain proposition and therefore have not ventured into this new
market. In this U. S. study, the customer-side renewable energy business model, depicted in
Figure 3, is being explored and accepted as a model which both IOUs and Co-ops have adopted
between 2009 and 2014.

Utility-Side
Renewable
Energy Business
Model

Generation

Customer-Side
Renewable
Energy Business
Model

Transmission

Distribution

Retail

Consumption

Figure 3 Richter (2011) EU Renewable Energy Business Models

Fundamentally EU business models are changing due to decreases in solar PV cost, increases in
regulatory environment pressure, and changes in customer behavior due to government incentive
programs. Is it possible that the renewable energy issues that impact the EU organization will be
debated and resolved in an EU model regulatory component? For the purpose of this study, the
business model refers to the Richter (2011) renewable energy nomenclature with a fifth business
model component of “regulatory” added by the author because the U.S. the electric utility
industry is regulated at all government levels: federal, state, and municipal. Table 2 provides an
overview of the Richter (2011) Business Model with the added regulatory component.
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Table 2 EU Business Model Components
Component

Utility-Side
Business Model

Customer-Side
Business Model

Value Proposition - is the bundle of
products and services that creates
value for the customer and allows the
company to earn revenues.

Bulk generation of electricity
fed into the grid

Customized solutions and
energy related services

Customer Interface - comprises the
overall interaction with the customer.
It consists of customer relationship,
customer segments, and distribution
channels.

Electricity as commodity and
customer pays per unit

Customer is involved in energy
generation by hosting the
generation system and sharing
benefits with the utility. Longterm customer relationship.

Infrastructure - describes the
architecture of the company's value
creation. It includes assets, know
how, and partnerships.

Small number of large scale
assets and centralized
generation

Large number of small scale
assets and generation close to
the point of consumption

Revenue - represents the relationship
between costs to produce the value
proposition and the revenues that are
generated by offering the value
proposition the customers.

Revenues through feed-in of
electricity. Economies of
scale from large projects and
project portfolio.

Revenue from direct use, feedin and/or from services. High
transaction costs.

Environmental mandates
incentivizing third-party solar
PV ownership. Variable
energy resources reduce grid
reliability.

Net metering and solar garden
legislation promotes distributed
generation. EU experiences lost
revenue and cross-subsidy
issues.

Added:

Regulatory - Federal and State
mandates and credits

Solar PV technology has the potential to affect components of the EU Business Model. The
presence of a third-party entity owning a utility-side or customer-side solar system effects the
typical IOU and Co-op business model with opposing interests creating a context in which the
interaction between EU leaders and stakeholders (consumers and policymakers) are important to
recognize (Elsbach, 1994). The business model for an IOU is a guaranteed return-on-investment
(ROI) as established by a state regulatory agency, the PSC. The IOU can recover its cost through
rate increases or exercising fixed cost infrastructure tariffs to keep the investor interests in check.
The business model for a Co-op is very different from a customer service context. Its Board of
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Directors (BOD) is typically comprised of business owners within the Co-op’s service territory
and rate increases are scrutinized by the Co-op’s customers, not a state agency. What is common
between an IOU and a Co-op is that solar PV may erode revenue through its use at the industrial,
commercial, and residential levels.

Although IOUs and Co-ops are both negatively affected by the emergence of solar PV where
revenue is concerned, differences also exist. IOUs and Co-ops often have divergent interests (i.e.
investor-owned vs. customer-owned and regulated vs. unregulated) resulting in customer tension
stemming from conflicts between rural versus urban customer service goals. Moreover, the
relatively small size of Co-ops makes leaders and key stakeholders easily identifiable, whereas
IOUs are typically very large and management heavy insulating the needs of the customer from
business drivers.

To exacerbate the solar PV issue, policymakers have encouraged disruptive competing solar
energy through various subsidy programs such as tax incentives, renewable portfolio standards,
and net-metering, where the pricing structure of utility services allows customers to engage in
the use of new technologies consequently shifting costs and lost revenues to remaining nonparticipating customers (EEI, 2013). Thus, the ongoing growth of solar energy will continue to
be a disruptive negative force in the EU industry. The potential impact of solar PV on the EU
industry, their customers, and regulatory agencies is shown in Figure 4 and Table 3. As shown,
the negative impact on the EU industry reveals an unclear value proposition for the development
of an economically sustainable revenue model. Thus, EUs may be far from reaching
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organizational ambidexterity in the field of renewable energy.

Renewables
+
Wind

Customer
Behavior

Solar
PV

rd

(3 Party)
-

+

Electric

-

Utility
+

Regulatory
Model

Figure 4 Electric Utility Solar PV Disruptive Model

Table 3 Electric Utility Solar PV Disruptive Character
IOU

Utility-Side

•
•
•
•

CustomerSide

Co-op

EPA (CPP)
VER ($)
IOU Guaranteed Cost
Recovery
Increased Rates

Urban America
• Elitist Enterprise
• Regulatory Market
Dependent
• Non-solar Cost-sharing
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•
•
•
•

EPA (CPP)
VER ($)
Third-party ownership
Increased Rates

Rural America
• Less Market
• Regulatory Market
Dependent
• Non-solar Cost-sharing

II.2 Organizational Ambidexterity
Organizational ambidexterity (OA) is the ability to pursue two different objectives
simultaneously (Porter, 1980). OA is a mental balancing act for managers of maintaining the
current core business while developing radically new products and services for the future of the
organization (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; March, 1991). Organization scientists have adopted
the human trait of ambidexterity (an ability to use both hands with equal skill) as a metaphor to
describe competent organizations. Thus, the theory of organizational ambidexterity suggests that
organizations are successful in the long term when they are able to exploit their existing
capabilities while developing new exploratory competencies (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).

Companies tend to divide their attention and resources between exploration and exploitation,
which are seen in the literature as two broad types of qualitatively distinct learning and
knowledge processes (Floyd & Lane, 2000; March, 1991). Exploration implies organizational
behavior characterized by variance-increasing activities including search, discovery,
experimentation, risk-taking and innovation, whereas exploitation is characterized by variancedecreasing activities including disciplined problem solving, refinement, implementation,
efficiency, production and selection (Cheng & Van de Ven,1996; March,1991). Organizations
look to expand their capacities to successfully confront intensifying paradoxes and effectively
manage contradictory challenges to ensure their viability and competitiveness in an increasingly
turbulent environment in which multiple and inconsistent contextual demands can emerge (Smith
& Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). The management of these organizational
paradoxes, contradictions, and conflicts (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989) is crucial in keeping an
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organization viable and enabling it to adapt and survive in the face of environmental
disturbances.

Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) distinguish between two forms of organizational ambidexterity structural ambidexterity and contextual ambidexterity. Researchers have determined that
structural ambidexterity (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) and contextual ambidexterity (Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004) are important for the growth of the ambidextrous organization.

Structural ambidexterity is the structural separation and coordination of entities into those
focused on exploration and those focused on exploitation, often with different performance
metrics where it involves splitting into different organizational units (Tushman & O’Reilly,
1996). Splitting into different organizational units is one structural ambidexterity process that
copes with the dilemma of balancing exploration and exploitation. O'Reilly and Tushman (2004)
examined several different structural responses to disruptive change and determined that
separating the organization responsible for dealing with a disruptive change from the existing
business with coordination at the senior executive level is the organizational template most
closely associated with structural ambidexterity. The second structural ambidexterity process that
some organizations use is focused on the organizational characteristics and competencies
required to sense new opportunities and threats, seize upon them, and then reconfigure the
organization to take advantage of the opportunities or counter the threats (O'Reilly & Tushman,
2004). The theoretical framing describes the three key capabilities in the structural ambidexterity
literature as the “tripartite taxonomy” of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring (Teece, 2007, 2010).
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Contextual ambidexterity is the ability for individuals within the organization to balance the
needs for alignment and adaptability (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) where it involves creating an
organizational context and responding to the organizational stimuli that inspire, guide, and
reward people to act in a certain way (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1997). Contextual ambidexterity
allows exploitation and exploration behaviors to grow, exist, and emerge in the same
organizational unit. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) have shown that the four established
characteristics of organizational context, as described by Ghoshal & Bartlett (1994), namely
discipline, stretch, support, and trust, are good indicators of contextual ambidexterity (Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004). In addition to these four organizational characteristics, Birkinshaw and
Gibson (2004) also identified four individual behaviors associated with contextual ambidexterity
(Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004, p. 49) which are initiative, cooperation, communication, and
multitasking.

Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) explain that contextual ambidexterity is the collective orientation
of the employees toward the simultaneous pursuit of alignment and adaptability. The key to
contextual ambidexterity is empowering employees to make day-to-day decisions on how to
balance exploration and exploitation, rather than having those decisions come from senior
management. To do so, it is necessary for senior management to create an organizational context
that provides support for individual employee decision-making roles and more generalist
positions (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004).

Specifically for this study, questions remain concerning the drivers for determining the EU
organizational ambidexterity type to pursue for the different solar PV dynamics. Primarily, this
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study seeks to understand EU organizational solar PV issues that give rise to paradoxes and
concessions to enhance long-term competitiveness (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).

The two research questions to be addressed in this study are: 1) How have EUs responded to a
shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology?

Another expectation is to determine to what extent IOUs and Co-ops have shown ambidextrous
behaviors during this time period. Also, an investor-owned utility (IOU) may have a different
strategy of how to structure its business model compared to an electric cooperative (Co-op)
because the IOU serves primarily urban customers and the Co-op serves rural customers. This
potential difference leads to the second research question: 2) What are the discernable business
model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and electric
cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology?

II.3 Sensemaking
To examine the EU business model changes through a problem-solving process, the framework
of this study begins with a critical organizational activity - “sensemaking” (Weick, 1995).
According to Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, (2005) sensemaking is a way of creating a shared
understanding that is plausible enough for a group to move toward action. Industry leaders use
sensemaking activities such as environmental scanning and issue interpretation to determine the
impact and control mechanisms necessary for organizational decisions and strategic change
(Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Other stakeholders such as consumers and legislators use sensemaking
activities to construct their global strategy (Pratt, 2000) and position (Gephart, 1993).
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Many EUs have established a resource planning process for their environmental and economic
sensemaking awareness. For example, a rolling three year integrated resource scenario planning
(IRP) process is being used by Georgia Power Company (GPC) to help it be more responsive
(ambidextrous) to the changing environment, as stated by an executive during a recent interview
(Roberts, personal communication, October 29, 2014). A study of the social processes of
sensemaking (Teece, 2007, 2010) suggests that with the advent of a disruptive technology,
integrated resource scenario planning (IRP) is a critical tool for fostering organizational
ambidexterity (OA) behaviors. An example of an IRP process (TVA IRP, 2010):

1. Identify Public Issues and Relevant Concerns
o Accumulate relevant issues and concerns from customers, employees, environmental
groups, and other key stakeholders.
2. Translate Public Issues and Concerns into Evaluation Criteria and Resource
Options
o Develop statements that reflect EU and stakeholder values to translate into an
evaluation criteria. For example, impacts on rates, environment, and fuel prices are
considerations in evaluating various future resource strategies.
3. Identify Possible Future Conditions (Uncertainties)
o Concerns and uncertainties are translated into future conditions. For example, high
growth in electricity sales, high cost of natural gas, and increasing air emission
controls in response to global warming are various future conditions.
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4. Construct Scenarios
o Scenarios are created and discussed in terms of its relevant attributes and objectives.
Scenarios are then evaluated using modeling and simulation techniques to measure
their performance against the evaluation criteria.
5. Use Trade-Off Analysis to Find the Best Strategies for the Future
o Once a set of feasible scenarios are developed, trade-offs are considered under the
different future conditions. Discussions on trade-offs within the EU and stakeholders
focus on how well various strategies might be able to meet selected evaluation criteria.

Past studies (Maitlis, 2005; Carmeli & Halevi, 2009) have examined the critical roles played by
leaders and stakeholders in the social processes of sensemaking. Maitlis’s (2005) four forms of
the social processes of organizational sensemaking can help to identify the degree to which
leaders and stakeholders engage in “sensegiving”. Maitlis (2005) said that sensegiving is the
attempt to influence others’ understanding of an issue. Maitlis states,
“Each of the four forms of organizational sensemaking guided, fragmented, restricted,
and minimal is associated with a distinct set of process characteristics that capture the
dominant pattern of interaction. They also each result in particular outcomes,
specifically, the nature of the accounts and actions generated” (p.21).

For this study Maitlis’s (2005) four distinct forms of the social processes of organizational
sensemaking guided, fragmented, restricted, and minimal were used for two purposes. First,
there was a need to organize the business model changes into the dominant patterns of
interaction between the EU leader and the stakeholder (consumer, policymaker). These
interactions or aggregate observable responses to internal (EU leaders) and external
(stakeholders) were witnessed through the interviews conducted, recognized as behaviors
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(stimuli) and grouped into Maitlis’s four distinct forms. Second, the four behavioral groups were
placed into Maitlis’s (2005) 2x2 framework (Figure 5) and overlaid onto the Cameron (2006)

Process Characteristics
• High Impact
• High Control

Process Characteristics
• High Impact
• Low Control

Outcome
• Collaborative

Outcome
• Create

Restricted Sensemaking

Minimal Sensemaking

Process Characteristics
• Low Impact
• High Control

Process Characteristics
• Low Impact
• Low Control

Outcome
• Control

Outcome
• Compete

High Sensegiving

Stakeholder Impact

Fragmented Sensemaking

Low Sensegiving

Guided Sensemaking

High Sensegiving

Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF) framework described in the next section.

Low Sensegiving
EU Leader Control

Figure 5 Four Forms of Organizational Sensemaking

II.4 Competing Values Framework
Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF) highlights the trade-offs, inherent tensions,
contradictions, and paradoxes that face organizations and their leaders as they navigate complex
and changing environments (Cameron, 2006). The basic framework is comprised of two
dimensions that express the tensions or competing values that characterize all organizations. The
center horizontal axis separates the continuum between flexibility, adaptability, and exploration
and the continuum of control, alignment, and exploitation (as shown in Figure 6). The center
vertical axis separates the continuum between efficient internal processes and capability versus
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external positioning and opportunities related to stakeholders such as competitors, customers and
investors. Each continuum highlights dichotomous performance criteria such as internal versus
external orientation (horizontal axis) or flexibility versus control (vertical axis). Each quadrant
has been labeled to describe its most notable characteristic. The CVF defines each quadrant:
Collaborate (upper left), referring to team, group, fellowship among collaborators; Create (upper
right), referring to the ability of people to collaborate in new, creative, and innovative ways;
Compete (lower right), the ability to focus on results, attainment, and attention to the competitive
landscape and external positioning; and Control (lower left), the ability to create, operate, and
maintain structures and systems that support organizational control and learning (Cameron &
Quinn, 2006, 2011). The two upper quadrants share an emphasis on energy and flexibility. The
two bottom quadrants emphasize control and stability. The two left-hand quadrants are both
focused on internal capabilities whereas the two right-hand quadrants are externally focused.
Contradictory elements are found through comparison of the diagonally, or diametrically,
opposite quadrants (Figure 6).
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Flexibility and Energy

COLLABORATE
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•
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CONTROL
•
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create, operate and

•

focus on results,
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and learning
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Figure 6 Competing Values Leadership Framework (CVF)
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III STUDY DESIGN
This study uses a multiple case design (Lee, 1999; Yin, 2007) in which EU business model
components are traced retrospectively beginning in 2009 through 2014. CEO annual reports,
regulatory maps, and integrated resource plans are collected for each of the EUs interviewed.
Interviews of key executives / managers from 11 electric utilities in 4 of the 10 states ranked
highest in 2013 annual PV capacity additions of solar energy in the U.S. were conducted (Figure
7). The fifth state, Vermont, one of the most progressive distributive customer-side business
model solar states in the nation, was also recommended in a pilot interview with the National
Rural Electric Cooperative representative from Washington D.C. Four pilot interviews were
completed with EU executives and managers and one additional interview with a SolarCity
executive. SolarCity is America's largest third-party solar power provider. Table 4 shows EUs
interviewed by region, name, state, territory served, type, and interviewee title.

Qualitative methods are well suited to the study of dynamic processes, especially where these
processes are composed of individuals’ interpretations (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Hinings, 1997).
Qualitative research typically examines issues from the perspective of the participant and is
frequently used in the study of organization members’ constructions and accounts (Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991; Isabella, 1990). This study uses an explorative qualitative research strategy to
address the two research questions. The retrospective approach will be used in order to gain an
in-depth understanding of how EU business models have changed since the beginning of the
American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009 through 2014 (see Timeline Figure 2).

Selection of interview candidates (Figure 7) involved a multi-step process. A recruitment script
was sent to selected IOU and Co-op executives and managers within the five selected states. If a
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reply was not received within two weeks, a phone call was made to the prospective executive or
manager. If they agreed to an interview, an informed consent form was e-mailed to the
interviewee for signature. On occasion, the interviewee recommended a key executive or
manager to contact. Those references proved to be very valuable in Vermont, Colorado, and the
Carolinas.

The states that were selected aligned across four regions of the U. S. (Southeast, Northeast,
Midwest, and Pacific). Each EU region has specific solar PV characteristics and inclinations that
are likely to be factors in how an EU responds. The location may impact the direction of the
issues and EU controls used to implement solar resources into their generation mix. For example,
the Southeast region has some of the lowest electrical consumer rates in the country and some of
the oldest and most established electric utilities.

The Northeast region has higher electricity rates than the Southeast and their natural gas supply
is limited due to confined pipeline access resulting in higher electric heating costs. The EU
industry regards this region as highly progressive with new technology; there is a need to
understand the EU impact and control mechanisms that are being proposed to reduce fuel costs.

The Midwest has an influx of renewables associated with the wind belt and highly stringent
renewable portfolio standards enacted by the states. Finally, the Pacific region (specifically
Hawaii) presents national renewable leadership in solar installations and the highest electric rates
in the United States. In addition, four pilot interviews were completed to confirm that the
interview protocol is a comprehensive solar PV emergence discussion instrument. Last, the
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SolarCity interview was done to understand the solar emergence from an EU customer-side
customer
third-party business model competitor’s perspective. The interview protocol (Appendix
Appendix A)
A is
designed to match each of Richter’s (2001) business model components. Because data collection
is intensive, fifty percent of the interviews were conducted face-to-face
face and the other fifty
percent were conducted by telephone.

SOLAR ENERGY
FACTS: 2013 YEAR
IN REVIEW

Solar Energy

Figure 7 2013 Solar State Rankings
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Table 4 Summary of Interview Data Sources
Region

Interviews & CEO Reports

State

Service Territory

Investor-Owned
Utility

Cooperative

Title

Pacific

Kaua'i Island Utilities
Cooperative

Hawaii

Kaua'i

Pacific

Hawaiian Electric

Hawaii

Oahu, Maui, Hawaii
Island, Lanai and Molokai

Midwest

Tri-States Generation &
Transmission Association

Colorado

Colorado, Nebraska, New
Mexico and Wyoming

x

Sr. Manager of Government
Relations

Midwest

Sangre de Cristo Electric
Association

Colorado

Colorado

x

Energy Use Advisor

Northeast

Vermont Electric Cooperative

Vermont

Vermont

x

CEO

Northeast

Green Mountain Power

Vermont

Vermont

x

Director of Government
Affairs

Southeast

Georgia Power Company

Georgia

Georgia

x

Vice President of Pricing
and Planning

Southeast

Georgia Power Company

Georgia

Georgia

x

Green Energy Program
Manager

Southeast

Georgia Electric Membership
Corporation

Georgia

Georgia

x

Vice President of
Government Relations

Southeast

Electric Cooperatives of
South Carolina

South
Carolina

South Carolina

x

Vice President for
Government Affairs

Southeast

Duke Energy

South
Carolina

South Carolina, North
Carolina, Florida, Indiana,
Ohio, Kentucky

Southeast

Santee Cooper

South
Carolina

South Carolina

x

x

Power Supply Manager

Communication Specialist

Manager of Renewable
Strategy

x

State-owned

Sr. Vice President of
Customer Service

Pilot Interviews

Southeast

Georgia Transmission Corporation Georgia

Georgia

x

Sr. Vice President of
Transmission Policy

Southeast

Georgia Transmission Corporation Georgia

Georgia

x

Vice President of
Transmission Planning

National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association

United States United States

x

Assistant Director of
Regulatory Counsel

Pacific

Anza Electric Cooperative

California

Southern California

x

General Manager

Pacific

SolarCity

Hawaii

AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI,
MA, MD, NJ, NV, NY,
OR, PA, TX, WA, and DC

Director Policy and
Electricity Market

The similarity of the 11 electric utilities (4 investor-owned and 7 electric cooperatives) allows for
meaningful stratified comparisons across the EU industry leaders and the stakeholders involved,
while the diversity and the differences between the EUs provide a reasonable basis for
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generalizability. The retrospective approach is used in order to gain an in-depth understanding of
how EUs business models are changing and becoming more ambidextrous in response to solar
PV.

The unit of analysis is the organizational level. The interviews are self-reports by senior
managers of what their respective organizations have done and are doing, of prevailing attitudes
towards solar PV and of their assessment of how well they are doing. Interviews are transcribed
and then coded with the aid of NVivo and Leximancer software; secondary data is coded with
Leximancer software. Both software programs are content analysis tools, however NVivo
requires the researcher to define the coding scheme whereas Leximancer generates its own
schema using word counts, word clustering, and proximity. Leximancer is also a text analytics
tool that can be used to analyze the content of collections of textual documents and to display the
extracted information visually.

The Leximancer information is displayed by means of a conceptual map that provides a bird’seye view of the material, representing the main concepts contained within the text as well as
information about how concepts are related. The conceptual map allows the user to view the
conceptual structure of a body of text, as well as perform a directed search of the documents. The
interactive nature of the map permits the user to explore examples of concepts, their connections
to each other, as well as links to the original text. Leximancer provides both a means of
quantifying and displaying the conceptual structure of text and a means of using this information
to explore interesting conceptual features. The 2009 and 2013 CEO reports and the IRP data
were imported into the Leximancer software for conceptual map comparison.
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Another secondary source of data is the regulatory map for each state which is compiled using
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (Solar, D. S. I. R. E. 2012) which
is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. DSIRE was established in 1995 and is currently
operated by the N.C. Solar Center at N.C. State University with support from the Interstate
Renewable Energy Council, Inc. The map includes state mandated renewable portfolio standards
or renewable state goals (Figure 8). A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) has been established
in 29 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. States shown in red have an RPS
whereas states in orange have a renewable state goal. For example, Hawaii has a state mandated
standard that a percentage of their load (40% by 2020) must be served by renewable resources or
they will be penalized. Colorado, also in red, has a state renewable mandate that requires that
30% of the IOUs load and 10% (recently changed to 20%) of the Co-ops load must be served by
renewable resources by 2020. Typically, monetary penalties are enacted when RPS (red)
standards are not met whereas RPS (orange) goals are typically tied to warnings to comply or
monetary penalties may be enforced.
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Figure 8 State Renewable Portfolio Standards

Interviews, CEO reports, and the regulatory map for each state are analyzed using Richter’s
business model components from both a utility-side and customer-side perspective (Table 2).
The EU utility-side responses are expected to be more robust and complete because of their
substantial experience resulting in more and larger projects. In addition, it might be expected that
the Co-ops are lagging behind the IOUs in their response to disruptive technology and changing
environment, perhaps due to a lack of resources to manage the work.

III.1 Data Analysis
The data analysis is comprised of three stages. Stage 1 is comprised of several steps of data
reduction. First, all 16 interview narratives (IOUs, Co-ops, and SolarCity) are coded into NVivo
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using the interview protocol responses associated with the four Richter (2011) business model
components with the additional fifth regulatory component. The four IOU and seven Co-op
narratives under study are then summarized into a 2x5 matrix for each EU. The matrix uses the
characteristics of impact (stakeholder driven) and control (EU leader response) on one axis and
the five EU business model components on the other. These characteristics help to interpret the
business model behaviors and strategies associated with the stakeholder (consumers and
policymaker) and EU leader interactions (Maitlis, 2005). Next, the Leximancer conceptual maps
are developed from the interview and secondary data for longitudinal EU leader business model
comparisons. Finally, a Competing Values Framework (CVF) is created for each EU to interpret
ambidextrous behaviors. In the second stage, the first research question is addressed: 1) How
have EUs responded to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar
technology?
In the third stage, the second research question is addressed: 2) What are the discernable
business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and
electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology?
The analyses are described in detail below and shown in Figure 9.
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Pilot Interviews

Stage 1: Code the narratives and merge with secondary
data.

16 Interviews and
CEO/IRP Secondary Data

Stage 2: Combine EU leader business model issues into
a 2x5 matrix to identify a set of solar PV issues that are
comparable across business model components.

Solar “Impact” and “Control”
characteristics organized to Richter
(2011) EU Business Model
Components including Regulatory

Stage 3: Analyze business model data and behaviors to
determine sensemaking type (guided, fragmented,
restricted, and minimal).

EU leader and stakeholder
interactions are analyzed to identify
sensemaking type.

Integrate Cameron (2006) Competing
Values Leadership Framework (CVF)

Stage 4: Integrate sense-making type with CVF to
interpret responses of the participants to determine the
extent to which they exhibit ambidextrous behaviors

CVF for each EU to help understand
and interpret their ambidextrous
behaviors associated with the 20092014 EU business model changes

Stage 5: Identify the comparisons and contrasting
patterns between IOUs & Co-ops

Figure 9 Data Analysis Flow Chart
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III.1.1 Stage 1 - Code the narratives describing the EU business model process
The initial data analysis stage begins with coding both the primary interviews and secondary data
sources using solar PV EU business model issues (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). The primary
data source is comprised of the 16 EU interviews using an instrument protocol derived from
Richter’s (2011) four EU business model components and the additional regulatory component.
The secondary data source is comprised of the EU 2009 and 2013 CEO annual reports, EU IRP
documents, and the state regulatory maps from the same 11 EUs. These are processed using
Leximancer to allow automatic coding of organizational issues. The solar PV issues that are
identified in the interviews, annual reports, and IRP documents that involve a concern are
mapped to one of Richter’s EU business model components. A typical issue must meet two
criteria for inclusion. The first criterion is that an issue must be mentioned in all EUs, in all
IOUs, or in all Co-ops. Meeting this criterion requires a process of data reduction (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998) in which the solar issues are divided into subset characteristics within the business
model components. The second criterion for inclusion is that data should be available from both
the interviews and annual reports or IRP documents. The expectation is to have at least two
subset issue characteristics within each Richter EU business model component: (1) Value
Proposition: utility-side (grid reliability) and customer-side (energy conservation); (2) Customer
Interface: utility-side (competition) and customer-side (distributed energy involvement); (3)
Infrastructure: utility-side (centralized generation) and customer-side (net-metering or
community solar); and (4) Revenue: utility-side (ownership) and customer-side (cross-subsidies).
A fifth business model component is added to include Regulatory: utility-side (EPA carbon) and
customer-side (leasing and net-metering).
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III.1.2 Stage 2 - Identify the four forms of EU Leader and Stakeholder Interactions
In searching for patterns of interaction in sensemaking (SM) there is a necessity to look for
consistencies in EU executives and managers. Patterns are revealed through a series of steps.
First, it is important to identify key EU leaders who controlled and/or were impacted by solar PV
in their EU and examine their contribution to the business model changes. The analysis of the
interview narratives may reveal various EU leaders as either playing major roles in virtually all
solar PV business model component issues or making critical contributions to two or three
issues. Next, by combining certain EU leader business model issues into a 2x5 matrix, it may
then be possible to identify a set of solar PV issues that are comparable across business model
components. Then, EU leader and stakeholder interactions are analyzed to identify how EU
leaders contributed through various sensegiving activities. Statements or activities that involve
providing plausible descriptions and explanations of extracted cues and constructing sensible
environments for others (Weick, 1995) are included as bulleted EU leader sensegiving impact
and control behaviors (2x5 matrix for each EU). For each EU there is a determination of which
of the four forms of sensemaking (guided, fragmented, restricted, or minimal) is prevalent by
counting the number of bulleted items and their frequency of involvement and determining the
behavioral strength/intensity associated with the model changes to which they contributed
through sensegiving activities. Finally, a CVF emerges for each EU to help understand and
interpret their behaviors associated with the 2009 - 2014 EU business model changes. These
findings are used to answer the first research question: 1) How have EUs responded to a shift in
their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a disruptive solar technology?
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In the third stage, the second research question is addressed: 2) What are the discernable
business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned (urban) and
electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology?

III.1.3 Stage 3 - Identify the differing patterns between IOUs and Co-ops
Identification of differing patterns requires focusing on the stakeholder accounts of EU impact
and EU leader actions of control associated with solar PV in their electric service territories.
Comparing the EU leadership in conditions of dynamic change is done by tracing through the
2x5 EU business model matrices developed above for each EU CVF. This comparison leads to a
set of descriptors that capture the differing business model patterns and ambidextrous behaviors
between IOUs and Co-ops. Through this iterative cross-case analysis, descriptions of the
differing patterns and behaviors are determined for each region. For these patterns, a Co-op is
generalizable to a medium-sized not-for-profit enterprise where an IOU is generalizable to a
large-sized private organization. An overview of data analysis is shown in Figure 9 and the CVF
template in Figure 10.
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Flexibility and Exploration (OA)

Control

Process Characteristics
• New Change
• Entrepreneur Type Leader
• Transformational Value
Proposition
• Effectiveness = Innovativeness
& Vision

Outcome: Contextual Ambidexterity
• Sustaining the organization and
its culture through stakeholder
engagement & development of
employees
• Behaviors: High Supportive and
High Directive - Coaching

Outcome: Structural Ambidexterity
• Creating the future through
innovation
• Senses, Seizes, and
Reconfigures
• Behaviors: High Supportive and
Low Directive – Supporting

Restricted Sensemaking
(High Control, Low Impact)

Minimal Sensemaking
(Low Control, Low Impact)

Process Characteristics
• Incremental Change
• Organizer Type Leader
• Consistency Value Proposition
• Effectiveness = Control &
Efficiency

Process Characteristics:
• Fast Change
• Competitor Type Leader
• Market Share Value Proposition
• Effectiveness = Aggressively
Competing & Customer Focus

Outcome: Structural Ambidexterity
• Operating the organization
efficiently through continuous
improvement
• Behaviors: High Directive and
Low Supportive - Directing

Outcome: Contextual Ambidexterity
• Expanding the organization
through acquiring financial
capital & attentiveness to
customers
• Behaviors: Low Supportive and
Low Directive - Delegating

Control and Exploitation (OA)
EU Leader Sensegiving
High

(Control)

EU Leader Sensegiving
Low

Figure 10 Integrating Business Model Changes with CVF to Interpret OA
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Stakeholder Sensegiving
High

Process Characteristics
• Long-term Change
• Teambuilder Type Leader
• Communication Value
Proposition
• Effectiveness = Employee
Development & Empowerment

(Impact)
External

Internal

Fragmented Sensemaking
(Low Control, High Impact)

Stakeholder Sensegiving
Low

Guided Sensemaking
(High Control, High Impact)

Create

L

Collaborate

Compete

IV RESULTS
This section presents the results from the 16 interviews with investor-owned and electric
cooperatives within five states that are considered solar forerunners in the United States (SEIA,
2013, 2014). The results address the impact of solar photovoltaics on the EU market first by state
and then by region. Next, the EU business model changes and OA behaviors that have helped
EUs respond to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 are discussed and finally the
discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned
(urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs are considered.
IV.1 Hawaii - Pacific Region: KIUC (Co-op) and HEI (IOU)
IV.1.1 Guided Sensemaking and Contextual Ambidexterity
Hawaii has the nation’s most expensive electricity because it relies on imported fuels for more
than 90% of its total energy, pushing prices up to an average $0.34 per kWh (kilowatt hour) for
2014 (prices through November), compared to 11 cents per kWh for the national average.
Imported oil currently accounts for around 71% of Hawaii’s electricity generation, followed by
16% from coal and 13% from renewables. These high prices have given solar a competitive
edge. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2013), wind and solar in
Hawaii are economically attractive alternatives, especially as their technology costs have come
down in recent years. Between 2010 and 2014, solar capacity has soared across Hawaii’s main
islands. By 2030, Hawaii expects to triple its solar capacity and have renewables supply 65% of
the state’s electricity (SEIA, 2014). Hawaii’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) targets 15%
renewables by 2015, 20% by 2020, and 40% by 2030. Typically Co-ops are not regulated by the
state’s public utility commission (PUC), but in Hawaii, KIUC is mandated to meet the RPS
standard just like HEI.
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Data analysis reveals KIUC and HEI business model components that are highly collaborative
value-enhancing activities resulting in the guided form of SM. The focus of these organizations
is on building cohesion through consensus and satisfaction through organizational involvement.
KIUC and HEI’s 2009 to 2014 trajectories point to collaboration signifying that contextual OA
had developed and was increasing during the time period (See Figure 11 Leximancer bar chart).
The KIUC and HEI leaders were very active in constructing and promoting understanding and
explanations of the solar energy business impact on their service territories with customers,
legislators, and the Hawaii Public Utility Commission (HPUC). At the same time, KIUC and
HEI were also actively engaged with stakeholders in attempting to collaborate on policies for
cost-sharing by implementing a fixed solar charge and proposing an avoided-cost for netmetering rates. These proposed policies were guided primarily by KIUC and HEI with the
HPUC.
KIUC and HEI business model component analysis also identified value-enhancing activities
within the competing values “Compete” framework that included aggressiveness and
forcefulness with HPUC in the pursuit of market share (rate decoupling) and utility-side solar
ownership competitiveness. The HPUC continues to implement regulatory obstacles forcing HEI
to own no solar generation. Peter Rosegg, HEI Communication Specialist, explains, “We have
an isolated system and we’re under a lot of pressure from the HPUC not to own generation at
all, much less for us to go venturing into the utility-side solar area that we have no experience
in.”
The HPUC generation ownership position has created some tension with HEI. If third-parties
own the majority of the solar generation, then HEI loses some control of operations which may
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affect reliability. Losing utility-side generation control and customer-side market share through
the solar emergence in Hawaii reinforces the need for HEI and KIUC to increase the capability
of enhancing their value creating competencies, specifically within their infrastructure and
distribution services. In 2013 HEI estimates that $38 million was shifted to non-solar customers
for grid upkeep. As the core mission of any organization is to create value, KIUC and HEI have
established goals that their shareholders (IOU) and customer-owners (Co-op) are expecting from
them. KIUC’s goal is to reduce residential bills by 10% over next 10 years, generate 50% of
electricity by renewables by 2023, reduce carbon levels to 1990 levels by 2023, establish a rate
structure to decouple margin from sales level to minimize subsidies between customer classes,
and to recover more of the actual cost of service through fixed charges. In this environment,
there is a need for Collaboration and Competitiveness. Cameron (2006) describes this leadership
behavior as speedy teamwork or urgent collaboration or “Autonomous Engagement”. (See Figure
42)
This integration of positive-opposites quadrants “Collaborate” and “Compete” or paradoxical
leadership behavior describes an EU leader that emphasizes teamwork and collaboration as well
as speed and urgency. Cameron (2006) explains, “leaders that act with autonomous engagement
actively seek involvement, but with secure and well-grounded motives.” The integration of these
two contradictory concepts within an organization have enabled Hawaii’s EUs to create a
contextually ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways to create
organizational value.
IV.1.2 Hawaii business model changes and OA
KIUC, who serves the island of Kauai (5% of Hawaii’s population), has been a leader in utilityside solar power installations where their power supply mix will soon reach 15% solar and 40%
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renewable. By contrast, HEI’s territory is more populated and the solar PV focus of HEI has
been on customer-side solar. The HPUC has forced its attention on HEI leaving the utility-side
generation business model, becoming more distribution service-based, and continuing to increase
their 11% customer-side solar mix.
For example, the Leximancer 2009 CEO reports show that KIUC and HEI consider solar energy
a value proposition to Hawaii. The Leximancer 2013 CEO report shows that KIUC, who was
beginning to install utility-side solar, is concerned about its grid; HEI, who was beginning to
become oversubscribed on customer-side solar, has concerns about losing its customer market
share to SolarCity. The KIUC and HEI interview data reveals concerns with net-metering, solar
cost-sharing, and grid operations. These utility-side and customer-side issues have forced the
EUs to change their business models pointing to an evolving ambidextrous organization that is
enhancing its value creating competencies, specifically within its infrastructure and distribution
services. When business model components are linked to the Collaborate and Create CVF
leadership dimension, an EU organizational ambidexterity type emerges.
EU leaders from the Co-op, IOU, and the HPUC recognize that there is value for all parties in
meeting the state Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in that renewables can effectively reduce
generation costs to half. Customer issues like net-metering, solar cost-sharing and grid
operations were recognized through interactions in meetings with investors, consumers, and
legislators which were organized systematically and typically planned in advance.
Both EUs have managed solar grid operations without adding additional departments or
organizations. HEI noted in its interview that the degradation of revenue and increase in
operational demands have been discussed and partially resolved in the regulatory environment

40

where stakeholder engagement and knowledge of the issues benefit the whole. Recently, HEI
and HPUC leaders have focused special attention on the backlog of customer-side rooftop
requests in an effort to reduce the installation queue list. With approximately 48,000 current
statewide solar customers and 500,000 potential customers, KIUC and HEI have teamed up with
SolarCity and industry subject matter experts to understand the problem and develop stakeholder
solutions. The concern is large amounts of rooftop solar energy overloading the capacity of the
grid. Overall, controlling the impact of the solar energy emergence via intelligent, systematic and
coordinated business model changes reveals contextual ambidexterity behaviors as shown within
the CVF Collaborate and Create dimensions.
IV.1.3 Identified differing business model patterns of HEI (IOU) and KIUC (Co-op)
The results in Tables 5 and 6 reveal by product of analysis that guided SM in the state of Hawaii
is prominent because the solar impact and control construct affects all five EU business model
components. A common theme throughout these analyses is that the regulatory component is a
foundation for the other four EU business model components. This regulatory foundation allows
stakeholders time to work with legislators to develop systematic and controlled approaches to
reconfiguring constructions of the solar energy emergence. In Hawaii, the strong competitive
edge of solar allows the state HPUC and EUs to engage easily and to incorporate the viewpoints
of the many different stakeholders. In addition, KIUC and HEI identified that they did not
develop new solar departments to handle the additional solar utility-side and customer-side
rooftop growth. All of these results reveal that KIUC and HEI are both displaying contextual
ambidexterity which emerged as a more decentralized business model on the solar challenges.
Brad Rockwell, KIUC Power Supply Manager explains,

41

“We thought solar would be an easy thing to do. I think one of the keys to success was
putting the development of it on the power plant guys, basically in my department,
because then it wasn’t like you had a separate department away from the operational guy
that was trying to develop a renewable. I think a lot of utility companies try to do that—
they kind of create a separate special renewable group and then you get the renewable
guys are trying to develop stuff and push the envelope and then these operational guys
are coming with—ah, don’t screw up—you know they come up with all these really harsh
criteria that are almost impossible for the renewable guys to meet because they don’t
want the conventional units to be impacted whatsoever. So by the fact that our boss put it
on us to make it work, we’re not able to point the finger at anyone except ourselves if it
doesn’t work. I think we’re doing that as much as anyone I’ve heard of. Like I said, we
have physically added only one body to do all this.”

An interesting finding in Hawaii is the impact of the regulatory component on the nature of
subsequent EU actions. For example, the collaborative partnership with SolarCity and various
research labs allowed HEI and KIUC to understand and resolve the operational constraints of
heavily solar connected circuits and, with the help of the HPUC, communicate these results to
the stakeholders. This proactive collaborative research opened up the queue and reduced the
backlog of customer-side rooftop solar requests. Thus these activities were based on a shared
interaction of KIUC’s and HEI’s competitive context and the value of collaboration which
facilitated the consistency of their EU control mechanisms over time.

42

Table 5 KIUC Interview Common Issues and Response
Value
Proposition

Stakeholder
Impact

EU
Control

Customer
Interface

Infrastructure

Revenue

Regulatory

Consumer
Savings

Staffing to
manage the
customer-side
solar requests

Excess
generation on an
islanded system

High cost of
power

RPS
Negotiations

Utility-side and
Customer-side
solar ownership

Lost (SolarCity)
Market Share

Cost-sharing

Netmetering

Net-metering

Operational
Flexibility
discussions with
stakeholders

Member
Communication
and Engagement

Battery
smoothing for
frequency
variations with
intermittent
solar

Renewables
driven by
BOD

Fixed solar
charge

Employee
Involvement

Solar contractor
collaboration

Technology
improvements

Cohesion
through
Consensus

Provide
distribution
Services
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Replace oil
with solar lower rates
Unbundle
net-metering
rates

Avoided Cost
Engineering
Collaboration

Table 6 HEI Interview Common Issues and Response
Value
Proposition

Customer
Interface

Infrastructure

Revenue

Regulatory

Consumer
Savings

Staffing to
manage the
customerside solar
requests

Established reliable
EU infrastructure
and operating
system

Highest rates
in the country
at 35 cents per
kilowatt hour

State
Residential
Energy Income
Tax Credit of
35%

Customerside solar
ownership

Lost
(SolarCity)
Market Share

In 2013, $38 M
shifted to non-solar
customers for grid
upkeep

Net-metering

Net-metering

HPUC forcing HEI
to bid all new
utility-side solar to
third-parties to
reduce generation
ownership

Renewables
driven by
HPUC

Retail rate
structure is
outdated and
does not
address the
issue of
unrecovered
fixed cost

Established reliable
EU infrastructure
and operating
system.

HPUC
recognizes that
there needs to
be some
interim and
long-term
revenue
changes

Issued technical
requirements
for solar
installations

Stakeholder
Impact

Employee
Involvement

Consumer
and
Policymaker
relationships

EU
Control
Guaranteed
Cost
Recovery
Through
Rates

Provide
distribution
Services

IV.1.4 Analysis for Hawaii
Interviews and CEO reports were analyzed with the Leximancer text-mining software where
words that occur very frequently are treated as concepts. The software includes an interactive
concept-mapping function which provides an overview of the conceptual structure of the data set
that assists in interpretation. Leximancer produced a set of concept maps that facilitated an
analysis showing how ideas and concepts in EU business models have changed from 2009 2014. The analysis was designed by tagging solar as the category of interest and the EU business
model components (value, customer, infrastructure, revenue, and regulatory) as concepts to
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investigate. A software generated bar chart identifies the most prominent concepts within the
particular category – defined via a measure of the combination of their strength and frequency
characteristics (see Figure 11). The relative frequency is a measure of the conditional probability
of the concept given the category. That is, how likely is it that the concept “customer” is
mentioned in the solar category? Strength is a measure of the conditional probability of the
category given the particular concept. On the graph, by looking at the position of the individual
concepts, it is possible to determine the closeness of their semantic relationship to other
concepts. The prominence of a concept in the data set is indicated by the size of the dot - the
more prominent, the concept, the larger the dot. If a concept sits close to solar it is, in relative
terms, more associated with that concept. Similarly the more central a concept’s location on the
map, the more it is shared with other concepts. Leximancer also ranks compound concepts and
concept count from the original base data.

For example the KIUC interview was mapped in Figure 11. The “customer” concept is the most
prominent concept within the “solar” category. This is not surprising since KIUC is a Co-op and
the customers are the owners of the EU. Not shown in the bar chart but identified in the
Leximancer report is that the most prominent concept pair was “value” and “infrastructure” and
that these two concepts, along with “rate”, were mentioned most in the interview.

Each EU is evaluated using the Leximancer data map related to the business model changes that
occurred during the shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014. The discernable business model
patterns that differ between investor-owned (urban) and electric cooperative (rural) are recorded
in Table 19.
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(Co-op #1 - Leximancer)
Figure 11 KIUC Interview (Co
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Figure 12 KIUC 2009 CEO Report (Co-op #1 - Leximancer)

(Co-op #1 - Leximancer)
Figure 13 KIUC 2013 CEO Report (Co
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The analysis of KIUC identifies that the focus of the CEO in 2009 was that KIUC’s
KIUC rates were
increasing due to the dependence on foreign oil for generation and their customer-owners
customer
were
questioning the viability and value of adding solar to the existing infrastructure
ure (electric grid).
grid) In
2013, the CEO focus was on installing more utility
utility-side
side renewables (solar and bio-mass)
bio
to the
transmission grid.. The concern about operability with intermittent resources had decreased and
utility-side
side solar appeared to be the best strategy to prevent customer
customer-side lost revenue and
increase customer satisfaction by lowering rates
rates. In 2014, the interview revealed
vealed that the value of
installing utility-side
side solar and biomass increased as customer rates decreased. The Leximancer
bar chart report reveals a larger focus on stakeholder discussions at the regulatory level. As solar
s
was taking a primary role in the ggeneration mix, the regulatory component was becoming more
popular for customer-side
side installations utilizing net
net-metering. In summary, the solar utility-side
utility
business model has become a supporting innovation for KIUC and the customer
customer--side business
model market
ket has been slow to develop because third
third-party
party providers like SolarCity do not see a
need for a market presence yet with such a small market share.

Figure 14 HEI Interview (IOU #1 - Leximancer)
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Figure 15 HEI 2009 CEO Report (IOU #1 - Leximancer)

Figure 16 HEI 2013 CEO Report (IOU #1 - Leximancer)
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The analysis of HEI identifies that the focus of the CEO in 2009 was on shareholder value,
infrastructure erosion discussions at the HPUC, and regulatory environment on renewable solar
energy. The concern was that the fundamental EU business model was changing. In 2013, the
CEO focus shifted to the needs of the customers and how solar energy was being debated at the
regulatory level with the HPUC. There was much less focus on the infrastructure and more
concern about lost revenue through customer-side rooftop installations (net-metering). The value
proposition appeared to be in renewables particularly solar to lower fuel costs. In 2014, the
interview conversation focused on the insurgence of solar within the HEI service territory and
the concerns that it brought to grid management and cost-sharing rates. There was also a focus
on third-party ownership of large utility-side solar. HPUC wants HEI to stay out of the solar
generation business and become a distribution service provider to keep costs down. In summary,
the HEI business model is changing to a distribution provider with an increase in engineering
services for grid management. Due to the increase in SolarCity rooftop leasing and increase in
third-party utility-side solar ownership, HEI is getting squeezed into the distribution service
market. Changes in the regulatory environment from 2010 - 2014 were minimal and Hawaii has
shown a steady growth emergence of solar with a very friendly net-metering environment for the
consumer. In 2013, $614 million was invested in Hawaii to install solar for home, business and
utility use. This is a 22% increase over the previous year. Solar installed prices have reduced by
8% from last year and 34% from 2010. Table 7 provides a regulatory overview of the present
federal and state credits available along with the IRP, EU goals, RPS and net-metering status.
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Table 7 Hawaii Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE*
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005
of 30% that expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016.
2. State: Commercial, Residential, and Multi-family Energy Income Tax Credit of 35%.
3. IRP framework adopted by HPUC in 1992, KIUC formed in 2002, HPUC adds Clean Energy
Scenario Planning to IRP in 2010, 2013 HPUC rejects HEI IRP.
4. KIUC Goals: Reduce residential bill by 10% over next 10 years, generate 50% of electricity by
renewables by 2023, reduce carbon levels to 1990 levels by 2023, establish rate structure to
decouple margin from sales level to minimize subsidies between customer classes and to recover
more of the actual cost of service through fixed charges. KIUC (Kauai has 5% of state’s
population) is presently at 13.3% renewables in 2014 with a 71% potential for 2020.
5. RPS: Cooperative and IOU must comply with 15% renewable energy net sales by 12/31/15, 25%
by 12/31/20, and 40% by 12/31/2030.
6. Net-Metering: 100 kW limit for HECO, MECO, HELCO customers with a 15% per circuit
distribution threshold. KIUC limit is 50 kW per customer with a 1% peak demand threshold. Net
excess is credited to customer’s bill at the retail rate at approximately $0.34 per kilowatt-hour
(kWh).
*DSIRE is the most comprehensive source of information on incentives and policies that support renewables and
energy efficiency in the United States. Established in 1995, DSIRE is operated by the N.C. Clean Energy Technology
Center at N.C. State University and is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy.
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IV.2 Colorado - Midwest Region: Tri-State (Co-op) and Sangre de Cristo (Co-op)
IV.2.1 Guided Sensemaking and Contextual Ambidexterity
Colorado has some of the lowest rates in the country at approximately 12 cents per kWh and
ranks as having one of the best net-metering policies in the country. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2013, 64% of the electricity generated in Colorado
came from coal, 20% from natural gas, and 17% from renewable energy resources. Colorado's
RPS requires IOUs to provide 30% of their generation from renewable energy resources by
2020, surprisingly the city of Aspen’s goal is 100% renewable resources by 2015, and Co-ops
serving 100,000 or more meters must comply with 20% by 2020.

Data analysis reveals Tri-State and Sangre de Cristo Electric business model activities are
collaborative value-enhancing guided SM activities. The focus of these EU organizations is on
the integration of organizational involvement with policymakers and consumer advocates. TriState’s and Sangre de Cristo’s 2009 to 2014 behavioral trajectories point to a guided form
signifying that contextual OA had developed and was increasing during this time period (Figure
43). In this environment the EU leaders demonstrate patience, support, and compassion for
consumers but also demonstrate power and challenges for stakeholders to improve. Cameron
(2006) identifies this leadership behavior as “Caring Confrontation” where leaders are “patient
and powerful, compassionate and bold, selfless and challenging” (Cameron et.al, 2006, p. 80).
For example, the Colorado Public Utility Commission (CPUC) continues to implement
regulatory obstacles against EUs forcing Tri-State to build and purchase additional and
unnecessary solar generation to meet the Co-op RPS mandate of 20% by 2020. Dave Lock, Sr.
Manager, Government Relations, explains; “The Colorado RPS was at 10% then just two years
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ago the legislature increased it to 20% without warning and now it is at 20% for Co-ops and
30% for IOUs.”

In this regulatory environment, there is a need for collaboration (Caring) and competition
(Confrontation). This integration of positive-opposites or paradoxical leadership behavior
establishes an EU leader that emphasizes the welfare of the state before personal interests, but
also challenges stakeholders and employees to live up to a high standard leader type model.
Cameron (2006) explains that people respond to leaders that “tell it like it is”, challenging
mediocrity but practicing kindness and compassion. These CVF behaviors enabled Colorado
EUs to create a contextually ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways
to create organizational value.
IV.2.2 Colorado business model changes and OA
The business model components identified were value-enhancing activities within the CVF
Compete quadrant that included minimal sensemaking requiring confrontations and challenges
with the CPUC in the pursuit of market share (residential rate decoupling), Co-op regulation
pressures, and utility-side solar grid upgrade costs. This minimal SM form and CVF dimension
(Competing) characterizes the impact of solar installations in varying degrees throughout the
country. For example, Dave Lock explains the sensitivity surrounding the fact that the Co-ops
are not regulated by the CPUC except for the RPS,
“For the RPS, yes, that’s an interesting question, because there is great sensitivity as to
whether or not we’re regulated. Of course, we don’t want to be. So what the Legislature
did is that we have to write a report and submit it to the CPUC on an annual basis to
show what our progress is toward reaching the 20% goal, but they have no authority
over us. There is nothing in the Statute that describes what happens if we don’t meet it. I
mean, there is no penalty, there’s nothing, so theoretically, a member of one of our Coops could sue us and say you aren’t meeting the standard and a court would decide
whether we are or not and if we’re not, I’m sure that they would then order us to. But
we’re planning on complying.”
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An additional issue lies with the differences in an IOU like Xcel Energy Colorado and a Co-op
like Tri-State Colorado in regard to cost recovery. Dave Lock explains,
“Xcel is doing the same thing that we’re doing; they’re just integrating solar into their
business model. You know, as a vertically integrated IOU, it’s a little different, you know
they can go to the CPUC and get cost recovery for the capital investments they are
making, so they are incentivized to actually build the stuff on their own rather than do a
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), like we do, because when they build on their own
they can get a rate of return on that invested capital. It’s good for the shareholders,
arguably maybe not so great for their customers, but that’s the approach they take. Of
course, for the Co-ops, the customers are our owners, and we’re trying to provide power
to them at the least amount of cost that we possibly can.”

In Colorado EU leaders are also working to define what value creation means to them in regard
to the EPA Clean Power Plan. With 67% of the Colorado electric capacity coming from coal and
an EPA 30% reduction mandate looming to reduce carbon-based fuel emissions by 2030, EU
leaders will have to confront stakeholders with an energy resource plan that will increase rates.
Cameron’s (2006) “Caring Confrontation” leadership behavior in Colorado has helped EUs
make their desired patterns clear to their employees and stakeholders with a focus on key value
drivers that motivate employees and create a competitive roadmap to prevent rate increases and
loss of market share.

Another example of minimal sensemaking (SM) occurred two years ago in the Colorado
legislative session. Without warning Colorado’s RPS was increased from 10% to 20%. The EUs
were not prepared for rebuttal and are now dealing with the consequences. Bill Bennett with
Sangre de Cristo Electric described the RPS change in the following way:
“Senate Bill 252, was introduced with only a handful of days left in the Session, no
discussion with Tri-State, no discussion with the Colorado Rural Electric Authority
(CREA), our statewide cooperative organization, no discussion with any Cooperative,
they just introduced it and passed it because they had the votes, and it caused an outrage
in the State….There was extreme outrage over the way they handled that.”
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Sensegiving from the EU leaders and legislators was minimal at that time, but EU leaders have
since engaged with regulators and policy makers regarding over-regulation to confront the
impact and control through caring and ownership. This CVF positive-opposite leadership
behavior is another step toward contextual ambidexterity. In 2012, Xcel Energy (IOU) in
Colorado opened the door with a new type of distributed energy service, community solar
gardens. Community solar gardens are centrally located solar arrays whose output is shared by
within county subscribers who pay an upfront or monthly payment to the developer. These
gardens are located close to the load reducing the necessity for large transmission lines. Xcel sets
up the program and has publicly endorsed the community solar garden product. The garden’s
energy is sold to Xcel at a retail rate plus renewable energy credit (REC) and then credited to the
subscribers at the avoided cost rate. Solar gardens enable small business and people who live in
an apartment, don't have a sunny roof or can't afford a full solar array to buy or lease a piece of
an array. The annual savings for a one kilowatt share in one of the Boulder gardens is about
$270, according to Clean Energy Collective, a Carbondale-based company developing 11 Xcel
solar gardens. Solar gardens laws have been established in Colorado, Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington, and are pending in California, the District of
Columbia, and Maryland.
IV.2.3 Identified differing business model patterns of Tri-State (Co-op) and Sangre de
Cristo (Co-op)
Solar processes have impacted the EU business model from 2009 - 2014 in Colorado. In 2009,
EU leaders and stakeholders had variable understandings of a variety of renewable energy
perspectives and EU actions of control that created minimal sensemaking. For example, in 2013
the policymakers increased the Co-op RPS percentage to 20% from 10% without any
collaborative discussion involving the Co-ops. These accounts of impact also tended to
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accumulate over time in legislative committees. In 2013, Colorado EU leaders and stakeholders
initiated a change from minimal to guided sensemaking. EU behavior changed to a “Caring
Confrontation” concept when the EUs instituted a renewed focus on customer service to their
Co-op member systems, investors, and stakeholders. This was also true for the city of Aspen
when they changed their goal to 100% renewable by 2015. Ken Anderson, Tri-State Executive
Vice President & General Manager, states in 2014,
“In 2013, 52 megawatts of Co-op renewable energy projects were constructed or under
development. Tri-State persists in analyzing our approach to cost effectively address an
expanded Colorado renewable energy mandate passed by the state legislature of which
the major components become effective in 2020. We had a renewed focus on customer
service to our member systems, and instituted an advisory council on demand response
and energy shaping products to support the success of these important initiatives. TriState continues to be engaged with regulators and policy makers regarding overregulation of utilities in the environmental, energy policy and reliability sectors, and we
continue to take steps to support compliance, reduce liabilities, control costs and create
efficiencies in these areas.”
A 2013 Colorado Energy Report prepared for the Colorado Office of Economic Development
provides evidence of EU support for a caring and supportive behavioral change,
“Colorado is at the center of this diversity and technology innovation, which presents
both great challenges and great opportunities, e.g., questions such as how do we manage
a grid that is fed by the sun and the wind as well as traditional sources; how do we plan a
transportation system in a city, a region or a nation when multiple vehicle types and fuel
types are demanded? Colorado’s great opportunity is to develop a collaborative
environment where the state’s abundant and diverse energy resources and technology
innovations can be united and integrated to allow the industry to grow in a manner that
will provide energy solutions that serve the state, national and global markets.”

Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) cite “organizational isolation” as a possible inhibitor to success in
ambidexterity situations. The concept of organizational isolation is that separate exploration
organizations often lose touch with the needs of the core business. This describes what happened
in Colorado in 2009. Structural ambidexterity was not working and a change was needed. When
the EU leaders found the balance between having patience, support, and compassion for
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consumers and stakeholders and knowing when to challenge legislators, contextual
ambidexterity emerged. As revealed in the examples above, the impact of the regulatory
component on the nature of subsequent EU actions was significant.

Table 8 Tri-State Interview Common Issues and Response
Value
Proposition

Customer
Interface

Third-party
solar services

Lost Market
Share
(SolarCity)

Utility-side
ownership

Infrastructure
Utility-side
solar would
require
transmission
upgrades that
are very costly

Revenue
Community
solar
gardens with
no aggregate
capacity
limit

Leasing

Excess Netmetering

Netmetering

Employee
Involvement

Renewed
focus on
customer
service

Cost-sharing
(Fixed Charge)

Renewables
driven by
BOD

Provide
distribution
Services

Solar
contractor
collaboration

Solar (VER)
discussions with
stakeholders

Building
Solar
Gardens

Stakeholder
Impact

EU
Control
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Regulatory
Provides
transmission to
other states with a
single postage stamp
rate (socialized
solar)
In 2013, the
legislature increased
the RPS from 10%
to 20% without
warning.
Need cost recovery
mechanisms for
owning solar rather
than third-party PPA
Engaged with
regulators and
policy makers
regarding overregulation

Table 9 Sangre de Cristo Common Issues and Response
Value
Proposition

Stakeholder
Impact

EU
Control

Customer
Interface

Infrastructure

Revenue
Community
solar gardens
with no
aggregate
capacity limit

Third-party
solar services

Lost Market
Share
(SolarCity)

Interconnection
requirements

Utility-side
ownership

Leasing

Excess Netmetering

Net-metering

Employee
Involvement

Renewed focus
on customer
service

Cost-sharing
(Fixed Charge)

Renewables
driven by
BOD

Distribution
Services

Solar contractor
collaboration

Distribution
services

Co-op has
Solar Tariff
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Regulatory
Federal Tax
Credit
Fear that RPS
will increase
again
Lobbying to
unbundle
Retail Rate
Engaged with
regulators and
policy makers
regarding
overregulation

Figure 17 Tri-State
State Interview (Co
(Co-op #2 - Leximancer)

Figure 18 Tri-State
State 2009 Ceo Report (Co
(Co-Op #2 - Leximancer)
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Figure 19 Tri-State 2013 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #2 - Leximancer)

(Co-op #3 - Leximancer)
Figure 20 Sangre de Cristo Interview (Co
The analysis of Tri-State
State and Sangre de Cristo will be combined because they are both Co-ops
Co
and have
similar business model issues. Tri-State
State identifies that the focus of the CEO in 2009 was on the
stakeholder relationships and future resource commitments. The relationship with stakeholders was
contentious and needed a refocus after the recent RP
RPS change without warning. In 2013, the CEO
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reported Tri-State was addressing the Colorado renewable energy mandates passed by the state legislature
in a cost effective manner. Both Co-ops initiated a renewed focus on customer service for their customers
and Tri-State instituted an advisory council on demand response and energy shaping products to support
the success of stakeholder relationships. In 2014, the conversation was primarily on lost revenue and how
Tri-State would allocate cost for the solar mandates in Colorado to Wyoming and New Mexico when they
were using a single transmission postage stamp rate for all of the states. Cost allocation and increased
rates have affected the consumers of Colorado due to the additional costs associated with customer-side
and utility-side solar. Variable energy resources (solar and wind) are replacing very reliable fossil-fueled
plants to meet the RPS percentage. In summary, as the EU business model has changed, so has the EU
behavior to a “Caring Confrontation” concept as shown when the EUs instituted a renewed focus on
customer service to their stakeholders. Table 10 below provides a perspective of the present renewable
portfolio standard (RPS), investment tax credits (ITC), and renewable goals within the state.
Table 10 Colorado Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE*
1.

Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 of 30%
expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016.

2.

State: Exemptions from state sales tax through 7/20/19, Xcel (IOU) performance-based incentive, and
various utility and city tax rebate programs

3.

RPS: City of Aspen goal is 100% by 2015. IOU must comply with 30% by 2020. Electric cooperatives
serving 100,000 or more meters must comply with 20% by 2020 with a distributed generation provision.
Cooperatives serving less than 100,000 meters 10% by 2020 with a distributed generation provision.
Municipals 10% by 2020.

4.

Net-Metering: Capacity is limited to 120% of average annual consumption for IOU customers. Capacity
is limited to 10 kW for residential and 20 kW for non-residential cooperative and municipal customers.
Meter aggregation is allowed for IOU customers and community solar gardens are allowed.
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IV.3 Vermont - Northeast Region: Green Mountain (IOU) and VEC (Co-op)
IV.3.1 Restricted Sensemaking and Structural Ambidexterity
Vermont like Colorado has been very friendly to solar and ranks as one of the best net-metering
states in the country. Vermont does not have an RPS but there is an established renewable
generation goal of 20% by 2017, 75% renewable by 2032, and 90% by 2050. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), nuclear power accounted for 70% of the
electricity generated within Vermont in 2013, a higher share than any other state and 20% of
Vermont’s net electricity generation was produced from conventional hydroelectric power. In
2011, Vermont had the lowest carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation among the
50 states. Vermont’s residential rate is approximately 17 cents per kWh.

The restricted form of sensemaking occurred when the EU business model changes were highly
controlled by the EUs while experiencing low impact by the emerging solar PV technology
(Figure 44). This form of SM was typified by Vermont Electric Cooperative (VEC) and Green
Mountain Power (GMP) in the state of Vermont. In each of these cases, EU leaders who engaged
in high levels of sensegiving developed processes to control the issues they encountered, whereas
stakeholders tended to accept the solar energy emergence impact with relatively few attempts to
provide alternative viewpoints or control. Dave Hallquist, CEO of VEC, when asked if the Co-op
can control the third-party solar emergence states,
“We’re going to try and compete with a community net-metering offering where we use
utility-side solar. Our philosophy is that we can build it a lot cheaper than they can. Our
data shows that less than one-third of our members have locations that are even ideal for
that situation. If we hit 11 or 12%, you know the market is declining for those roof top
solar developers. We think if we do a good community net metering offering, it’s a better
deal than roof top solar because you don’t have to do solar panels on your roof or your
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yard—you get all the benefits but you don’t have to worry about operational
maintenance. We could offer a better deal.”
Both EU leaders interviewed at VEC and GMP displayed “Control” quadrant (confidence and
assuredness) and “Create” quadrant attributes (openness and teachableness). Cameron (2006)
describes this as “Teachable Confidence” leadership behavior. Teachable confidence is facing
the unknown and continually moving forward so as to co-create a new reality (Cameron, 2006).

This openness to change and entrepreneurial confidence was noticed in both interviews and
emerged in the Leximancer CEO reports. The EUs recognize that their state is in a rare position
with a 90% generation dependence on nuclear and hydro. This allows them to be forerunners in
the renewable EU market with a low risk factor. They can manage a controlled experiment,
whereas a state that has to retire fossil-fuel generation and replace it with renewables has a
higher reliability risk factor. Vermont is losing revenue due to the emergence of third-party
leasing and net-metering (NEM). VEC and GMP are demonstrating structural ambidexterity
because they have sensed an opportunity to add electric services (community NEM, electric
vehicles, and HVAC) that will supplement their lost net-metering revenues; they are seizing
those opportunities through a “Teachable Confidence” leadership behavior in working with the
VPUC. The next and final step for GMP is the reconfiguration of its business model to a servicebased customer model instead of a vertically integrated generation, transmission, distribution
service model.
IV.3.2 Vermont business model changes and OA
One example of business model changes is when restricted sensemaking was seen in this year’s
proposed RPS bill. VEC and GMP, jointly with the Department of Public Service (consumer
advocate), proposed legislation that will allow the RPS to be credited for offsetting electric
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transportation, heating and cooling. With some consumer advocate support, regulators and
stakeholders are confident that this “behind the meter” advantage will be approved and should be
included in their business model as an RPS credit for the EUs.

EU leaders in Vermont have one of the most open net-metering policies in the country and
believe that in the future, EUs will move away from the traditional vertically integrated utility
model towards a more distributed, service-based model. VEC and GMP are positioning their
business plan models to accomplish this goal. A few key stakeholders, VPUC, and legislators
have engaged in private meetings with VEC and GMP leaders in which they are listening to the
distributed, service-based model proposal. Sensing this new opportunity, seizing, and then
reconfigure the organization to take advantage of the opportunity describes the three key
capabilities in structural ambidexterity.

The Leximancer 2009 CEO report shows that GMP and VEC were concerned about their future
energy needs and if the transmission grid was not as important to their business model. The
Leximancer 2013 CEO report shows that VEC and GMP were focused on regulatory issues,
rates, and net-metering associated with solar energy.
IV.3.3 Identified differing business model patterns of GMP (IOU) and VEC (Co-op)
The controlled nature of restricted sensemaking produced a limited interpretation of the future
and how the focus should be on improving through incremental change. This singular focus
resulted not from VEC and GMP leaders working to integrate and synthesize multiple
perspectives with stakeholders, but from a lack of alternatives and explanations on the dominant
EU solution (i.e. distributed service-based business model). Although EU leaders in Vermont
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may generally have broader understandings of some issues than do individual consumers and
investors (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), their perspectives do not include the variety of
perspectives that exist across a range of interested consumers and investors. However, the CEOs
are willing to listen and learn. For example, in a group net-metering case, 500 kilowatt systems
are being built and used for group net-metering where the developer may only have one or two
big solar customers. EU leaders are requesting a limit to this type of community solar garden
approach because it does not appear to benefit the community or the EU. VEC and GMP leaders
are displaying humility, teachableness, confidence, and assuredness behaviors by considering a
new EU business model and listening to multiple perspectives of residential and commercial
consumers. For example, Robert Dostis, Green Mountain Power Director of Government Affairs,
explains how they will recover lost revenue,
“So the solar build out has begun in Vermont…Green Mountain will be at 15% solar by
the end of 2016….The way our law is now, if our customers produce enough solar power,
they can bring our billing down to zero… so the concern is that they are using the system
in every form but they’re not paying towards it, and then the amount of revenue to the
utility is declining… We have to bring in new revenues into our company to offset the
revenues that are lost. And that will happen in two ways—one is by electrification of
both heating and transportation so we’ll see an increase in load, and the second is new
products and services that we will be offering our customers that will bring new revenues
into the company while at the same time reducing our customers overall expense—not
only in the electric sector but also in the thermal sector and in the transportation sector.”

The specific needs of VEC and GMP to reduce the solar impact produced a restricted
sensemaking process describing a highly specific Control CVF behavior for action. In 2012, both
EUs realized they were losing some of their consumers due to third-party roof-top leasing. The
EUs in Vermont are mandated to pay 20 cents per kWh for net-metering when the current EU
retail rates are 17 cents per kWh. Specifically, the EUs are losing market share and have to create
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new business opportunities. Dave Hallquist, CEO for VEC, described the future like an
entrepreneur by focusing on new change,
“Solar leasing companies were out there badmouthing the utility seller—you know,
saying that we’re not ready to make the change—so we successfully reversed that
because we aggressively got out and started building community solar and started to
market the concept…. So, we truly believe, and I’m speaking for Vermont, of course—I’m
not sure where the rest of the nation is--but in Vermont our concept is that we think
transmission is a bad investment—we think we’ve got to start focusing on distributive
generation, and that is our focus.”

VEC and GMP leaders, who are characterized by “Teachable Confidence” in this study, have
more influence and create more value by integrating positive-opposite “Control” and “Create”
behaviors as described by Cameron’s (2006) CVF quadrants. So how are VEC and GMP
creating new value? Co-ops are building community solar gardens and staying involved with the
latest battery storage technology, creating value for their members. The IOUs are using the state
regulatory programs to procure power purchase agreements (PPA) with third-party utility-side
solar owners and, as GMP says, creating new markets by developing an “Extreme Energy
Makeover” program to serve more like a general contractor for home energy improvements.
Converting consumers to a total electric plan (from natural gas) would supplement the lost
revenue from roof-top solar. Specifically, both EU leaders are creating value by proposing a
change or revision to the RPS with the backing of the Department of Public Service (consumer
advocate) to allow credit for offsetting electric transportation, heating, and cooling installations.
Dave Hallquist, VEC CEO, stated,
“If we can take our 90% carbon free footprint and create incentives for our members to
go out and put in air/heat pumps to convert to higher efficiency electric systems for their
heating, and electric vehicles, we’re going to get credit for that. There is an opportunity
to sell a hell of a lot more kilowatt hours by incorporating transportation, heating, and
cooling into our portfolio.”
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O’Reilly and Tushman (2007) point out that structural ambidexterity is focused on the
organizational characteristics and competencies required to sense new opportunities and threats,
seize upon them, and then reconfigure the organization to take advantage of the opportunities or
counter the threats.

Table 11 VEC Interview Common Issues and Response

Stakeholder
Impact

EU
Control

Value
Proposition

Customer
Interface

4 yrs. ago
incentives were
to take people
off of electricity

Infrastructure

Revenue

Regulatory

Residential
roof-top
handled by
third-parties
and is
aggressive

Excess netmetering

Pay retail,
plus three
cents for netmetering

Aggressive Netmetering Law.

Liberal group
promoting
aggregate netmetering
(community
solar)

Non-solar
customers
should not see
rate increase
because they
are covering
more of the
standard costs

If EU serves
72% of the
load then must
take 72% of
the power
output of the
Renewable
Standard Offer
projects

371
installations
causing a
cross-subsidy
of about
$587,000

Three renewable
programs direct
EUs in how much
renewable they
have in their
portfolio

Solar
opportunity with
an open BOD

Increased the
peak demand
cap to 15% and
reserved 4% of
for community
net-metering

Have to focus
on distributive
generation

Proposal to allow
RPS credit for
offsetting
transportation and
heating and
cooling

Adding
transportation
and HVAC
portfolio

Solar customers
should pay a
tariff

Converting to
a distribution
service model

Create
incentives to
put in air/heat
pumps and
electric
vehicles
Solar
customers
should pay a
tariff

Solar customers
should pay a tariff

Table 12 GMP Interview Common Issues and Response

Stakeholder

Value
Proposition
Retail rate plus

Customer
Interface
Net-

Infrastructure
Serves 72% of
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Revenue
Net-metering

Regulatory
Three different

Impact

4 – 5 cents
depending on
the size of the
system

Net metering
limit goes up
to 500 kW

Solar Gardens
EU
Control
Electrification
of heating and
vehicles

metering
causing
declining
revenue

the State, must
take 72% of
the power
output of the
Renewable
Standard Offer
projects

Third-Party
Leasing
4% of load
is from
solar and
will be
15% by
end of
2016
Solar
customer
tariff
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causing
declining
revenue

Excess netmetering

Retail rate plus
4 – 5 cents
depending on
the system

First IOU to
go to
Distribution
service model

Cost recovery
through the
rates (cap on
ROE)

Community
Solar

Electrification
of heating &
vehicles

renewable
programs direct
utilities in terms of
how much
renewable they
have in their
portfolio
SPEED law
(Sustainable
Economic
Enterprise &
Development)
Proposal with
consumer
advocate to allow
RPS credit for
offsetting
transportation and
heating & cooling
Regulatory
Support

Figure 21 VEC Interview (Co
(Co-op #4 - Leximancer)
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Figure 22 VEC 2009 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #4 - Leximancer)
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Figure 23 VEC 2013 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #4 - Leximancer)
The Leximancer analysis of VEC in 2009 (Figure 22) reveals a concern for the transmission grid and its value
moving forward with the increas
increase in customer-side solar. Third-party solar leasing was increasing with the
potential to erode revenue. There was a growing concern that if the solar PV disruptive technology takes
take root,
it could eventually impact the EU
EU’s residential market. In 2013, the Leximancer report (Figure 23) shows a
significant shift in the EU business model. The concepts under study were more central
ce
in the mapping around
solar and the regulatory component was highlighted. VEC had moved into the “Create”
Create” CVF quadrant as a
result of changing its behaviors toward residential customer service by developing community solar projects
and getting more involved with customer electricity needs in the home. In 2014, the interview (Figure 21)
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revealed that net-metering
metering was still a concern
concern, but the transformation to a distribution service organization was
becoming a reality. In summary, the rregulatory
egulatory relations appear to be strong with VEC,
VEC thereby effectively
allowing VEC to build community solar facilities an
and
d customer energy services in the home thereby reducing
costly RPS projects and increasing revenue.

Figure 24 Green Mountain Interview (IOU #2 - Leximancer)
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Figure 25 Green Mountain 2009 CEO Report (IOU #2 - Leximancer)

Figure 26 Green Mountain 2013 CEO Report (IOU #2 - Leximancer)

73

The Leximancer analysis of GMP in 2009 reveals similar results to VEC in that there was a
concern for the transmission grid and its value moving forward due to the increase in solar from
customer-side rooftop installations. Rates were increasing in response to loss in revenue realized
from net-metering, resulting in unfair cost-sharing for non-solar customers thus creating
behavioral changes for the residential market. In 2013, it appears that GMP was concerned about
the loss of revenue from net-metering and wanted to move their business model towards
distribution services, but the process was slower than VEC. This slower process to change may
be attributed to the size of the IOU and the fact that it is regulated by the VPUC. The GMP
Leximancer mapping shows that revenue, customers, and rates are pointing to net-metering as
still being a concern. In 2014, the interview data revealed that while solar concepts were
becoming more prevalent, GMP was becoming more active by creating community solar gardens
as well as new programs that encouraged the electrification of residential heating and promotion
of electric charging stations for vehicles. From 2009 - 2014 VEC and GMP have made
significant business model changes. The primary difference was a change in the value
proposition for both companies. The popularity of customer-side rooftop solar, third-party
leasing, and ownership encouraged EUs to create a new revenue model more focused on
customer services. Vermont has one of the friendliest net-metering policies in the country and
consumers are taking advantage. The EUs are installing community solar gardens to negate this
lost revenue. Table 13 provides a regulatory overview of the present position of the federal and
state credits available along with the RPS and net-metering status.
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Table 13 Vermont Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE*
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 of
30% that expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016.
2. State sales tax exemption for systems up to 250 kW. GMP performance-based (net-metering
systems only) incentive of $0.06 credit per kWh in addition to the value of the net-metering for 500
kW systems.
3. Enacted legislation in 2009 that retail electricity providers must purchase electricity generated by
eligible renewable energy facilities up to 2.2 MW through the Sustainably Priced Energy
Enterprise Development (SPEED) Program via long-term contracts with fixed rates. RFP process
caped the rates at avoided cost rate.
4. Small-scale renewable energy incentive program that allows systems that generate 1,000 kW/year
of DC capacity can receive up to $2,850.
5. Do not have an RPS but there is an established renewable goal of 20% of electricity needs with
SPEED by 2017, 75% renewable by 2032, and 90% by 2050.
6. Net-Metering: 500 kW limit for all systems other than military (2.2 MW) and micro-CHP (20 kW).
Aggregate capacity limit of 15% of utility’s peak demand (1996 peak minimum). Excess is
credited to customer’s next bill at retail rate. Group meter aggregation allowed and 15 kW or less
system follow an expedited permitting process.
.
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IV.4 Georgia and Carolinas - Southeast Region: Georgia Power Company (IOU), Georgia
Electric Membership Corporation (Co-op), Duke Energy (IOU), Electric
Cooperatives of South Carolina (Co-op), Santee Cooper (State-owned)
IV.4.1 Restricted Sensemaking and Structural Ambidexterity
In 2013, Georgia was ranked seventh in the U.S. with 91 MW of solar installed by Solar Energy
Industries Association (SEIA). Georgia and South Carolina residential retail rates are
approximately 11.5 cents per kWh. Georgia’s four existing nuclear reactor units accounted for
27% of the state’s net electricity generation, coal accounted for 33%, natural gas for 34%, and
renewable energy for 6%. Georgia ranked tenth in the nation in net electricity generation and
eighth in retail sales of electricity. In 2015, Georgia has a new solar H.B. 874 that amends
Georgia law to allow energy produced by solar panels to be factored into a lease or financing
arrangement by consumers. This legislation applies only to solar installations for an individual
home or business and limits solar production to the consumer’s energy needs. Georgia does not
have a state mandated RPS or a voluntary renewable energy goal.

In 2014, S.B. 1189 was approved in South Carolina mandating the creation of a voluntary
Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Program and establishing new net-metering rules. The
legislation allows participating utilities to recover costs connected to meeting a 2021 RPS target
of 2% aggregate generation capacity from renewable energy sources. The bill also mandates that
the PSC create a program to offer nonprofits easier access to renewable energy and to incentivize
residential customers to become customer-generators by purchasing or leasing renewable
generation equipment.
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In Georgia and South Carolina restricted sensemaking was found in varying degrees within the
five EUs that serve the two states. Each EU tended to await others’ interpretations of an issue,
which typically came in response to some external trigger. Georgia Power Company (GPC)
stated,
“Waiting and watching other jurisdictions helped them learn a lot of things to do and not
to do. Not being the first mover was beneficial because waiting a little longer until the
solar costs came down allowed us to structure our solar market in a way that was
beneficial for everybody, not just to those who install the solar but to the other customers
who do not install roof-top solar.”

Solar impact to the EU business plan processes was low, with a few stakeholders discussing the
issue or seeking to offer their opinions. At the same time, some EU leaders made an attempt to
organize ways of promoting their interpretations of solar issues and gather the views of their
stakeholder groups in a systematic way at the regulatory level. The transfer from restricted SM
form to fragmented SM enabled parties to interpret the solar energy situation and synthesize the
perspectives of multiple stakeholders, initiating the “Create” CVF dimension (Figure 45).
Cameron (2006) describes this type of paradoxical leadership based on hope and vision found in
the “Create” CVF quadrant and the behaviors of Reason and Practicality within the “Control”
CVF quadrant. With the Southeast region having the lowest electric rates in the country, the EU
leaders displayed both practical and visionary tendencies. Logical optimism and realistic
enthusiasm describe leaders that have developed “Practical Vision” behaviors where they can
see both the realities and practicalities of the present and the possibilities in the future.
IV.4.2 Georgia and South Carolina business model changes and OA
The CVF “Create” dimension describes a behavior of innovative change which results in hope
and vision. The data shows that the EU leaders in the states of Georgia and South Carolina are
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visionaries and have implemented practical vision by combining hope and optimism with reason
and logic. This behavior triggers breakthrough thinking. For example, Georgia Power stated,
“We don’t have an RPS here, we don’t have a renewable portfolio standard and we think
that is absolutely the wrong way to go….We don’t have a goal, we don’t have a standard,
we have no infringement on the Territorial Act…we’ve maintained our avoided cost
methodologies, all of those things are very important to customers over the long term.”

But GPC has implemented a new organizational structure to handle the solar workload and
initiated an “Advanced Solar Initiative” program per requirements of their PSC approved IRP.
GPC explained,
“We have created a separate organization, and even within my organization there is a
team specifically designated to do utility-side and a team specifically designated to do
distributed generation (DG), because they are so different in dealing with a 4 or 5 KW on
a residential customer’s house is way different than a 50 megawatt solar farm….We’ve
had to change because we’ve gotten so much solar...190 megawatts of DG is bigger than
almost every state out there….We project that our renewable percentage by 2020 is going
to be somewhere around 2% on a capacity basis.”
Cameron (2006) says that leaders who develop “Practical Vision” can see both the realities of
the present and the possibilities in the imagined future. The behavioral trajectory from 2009 to
2014 has been along a positive-opposite creative value framework where EU leaders were
focused on incremental change in the “Control” dimension and a transformational new change in
the “Create” dimension. During this four to five year period, EU leaders began by making little
attempts to shape understandings of an appropriate solar perspective with stakeholders or
influence how others saw a particular issue because the impact of solar energy was very
restricted. But as the EU business model components became affected, behaviors changed and
the impact of solar required a new value creation dimension.
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The Leximancer 2009 CEO report shows that Georgia Power (IOU) and GEMC (Co-op) were
concerned about the value proposition that renewable energy brought to the EU and the
customer. The cost to meet the Federal emission reduction requirements appeared to be the main
concept under review. In 2013, the focus was still on the EPA restrictions but the discussions
were moving into the regulatory environment with the PSC. The impact to the infrastructure with
fossil-fuel plant retirements and solar additions became more important. The 2014 interview
results revealed business model shifts that were significant. Customer rates associated with solar
build out and regulatory policies came to the forefront in the mapping. The net-metering leasing
bill and the replacement of a dispatchable coal resource with a solar variable resource was
discussed. In summary, the data shows that the EU business model is shifting toward a model
dominated by the regulatory business model component.

Duke Energy (IOU) and ECSC (Co-op) results were very similar to GPC and GEMC. This
substantiates the grouping of these IOUs and Co-ops into a Southeast Regional category.
IV.4.3 Identified differing business model patterns between IOUs and Co-ops
Instances of restricted and then fragmented sensemaking led to positive-opposite behaviors to
create value for consumers and investors. Initially, in 2009, stakeholders failed to offer
spontaneous solutions to the solar issues, and as EU leaders neither encouraged them to do so nor
put forward their own interpretations, SM in the restricted form produced only simple examples
of impact. As a result, IOU and Co-op leaders focused on improving internal processes to
increase efficiency. But as solar PV material costs decreased and regulatory pressures increased,
EU leaders and stakeholders started to grasp the narratives of solar issues that might provide
some basis for value creation. For example EU leaders and stakeholders, who struggled with the
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issues initially, began to sense that they needed to work together to develop better solutions.
They began to engage in sensegiving with respect to the issue and not avoid conflict as they had
done a few years earlier. After years of uncertainty and procrastination in legislation, the IOU
and Co-op leaders and the PSCs suggested flexible net-metering and leasing arrangements that
would avoid judicatory procedures. The fragmented SM enabled the interpretation of the solar
energy situation to take place with multiple stakeholders, initiating the “Create” CVF dimension.
IOUs started demonstrating structural ambidexterity. The resource constraints and the lack of
solar growth in the rural areas allowed Co-ops to absorb the workload with existing processes
and procedures demonstrating contextual ambidexterity. As growth increases, the expectation is
that the urban Co-ops will be the first to move from a contextual ambidextrous environment to a
structural environment.

When single explanations of impact become multiple narratives, communication transforms from
the restricted SM to a more fragmented SM form of communication. These multiple narratives
that served as a catalyst for change included a new cost benefit analysis through government
subsidies, the “Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights” position that homeowners were taking on
private property rights (owner’s exclusive authority to determine how private property is used),
and manufacturing cost reductions for solar PV. The previous simple interpretation of the
explanation of impact had produced very weak foundations and EUs developed a “Control”
behavior that did not motivate change from anyone. The earlier simple accounts of impact acted
as discursive resources for EU leaders as they attempted to respond to an issue (Weick, 1993) doing little to foster either motivation (reasons for action) or imagination (insight).
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In South Carolina, with new legislation allowing IOUs and Co-ops to recover solar incentives
offered to homeowners and with the approval of third-party leasing of roof-top solar, Duke
Energy was the first to implement change through incentive proposals. Duke Energy explains,
“The net-metering, we’re going to require going forward, in South Carolina…is to put a
second meter out there at our cost, or we’re going to call it a distributive energy resource
cost and charge it through this budget that the General Assemble is giving us.…We’re
going to get that interval data, in the most efficient way we can. So we’ve got to do
sampling now of all the renewables…to really understand what benefits they’re bringing
to the system, what are they drawing from us, when are they putting stuff out there, and in
a way that our rates group does not currently do it. We are pushing change within the
company in our rates group, in our metering group, in our IT group--that’s been our
mandate, we must push for the change. South Carolina for us is a Petri dish, it’s the first
state where we have a legislative mandate to revise net-metering, where we have a
legislative mandate to provide customers with the price signals to adopt solar in a
distributive generation fashion and a roof top fashion.”
This decision demonstrates that Duke Energy has sensed an opportunity to recover their solar
incentive costs and is seeking to understand the dynamics of the solar market in South Carolina
with a Creative behavior. Georgia was soon to follow with its own Creative behavior through its
regulatory business model. The proposed Georgia HB 874 amended current Georgia law to allow
energy produced by solar electric generators to be factored into a lease or financing arrangement
by consumers. GEMC (Co-op) explains the solar industry position,
“The solar industry has become really aggressive in lots of different ways over the last
four to five years in Georgia…” The solar lobby “…got smart and started hiring
lobbyists that had success with conservative issues and shifted their messaging from an
environmental message to a property rights message. They started going to the more
conservative side of the Republican caucus, some might consider themselves to be “tea
party.”
The GEMC continues by explaining the proposed bill,
“In 2014, Representative Mike Dudgen proposed a leasing Bill; EUs …had a resounding
message given to us that this issue is not going to go away. Wouldn’t it be better if the
utilities sat down at the table and drafted the Bill with something you can live with and
equally addresses your concerns, as opposed to just fighting this Bill year after year,
because eventually you’re going to lose and you’re going to have to live with whatever
that Bill is, so why not draft one yourselves…”
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GPC and GEMC were heavily involved in this piece of legislation which is considered a win-win
in that it fairly addresses the needs of both EUs and consumers. As stated earlier, “Practical
Vision” has taken shape in both states with a bit of variability in timing between IOUs and Coops based on available resources and solar growth rates. The realities of the present and the
possibilities in the imagined future are transforming the EU leadership to an organizational
ambidextrous form that makes sense.

Table 14 GPC Interview Common Issues and Response

Stakeholder
Impact

Value
Proposition
735 MW
Advanced Solar
Initiative
program for
utility-side and
customer-side
Bid out the
DG market to
lower payouts

EU
Control

Two meter Residential buy
at retail rate,
GPC buys at
avoided cost.
20 yr. contracts

Avoided cost
for netmetering

Customer
Interface
Customers get
into solar for
environmental
reasons,
hedging, and
rate security
Solar is more
dominant in
the urban
areas

Infrastructure

Revenue

Regulatory

Unfair costsharing

Roof-top solar with
one meter offsets
their usage – lost
revenue.

Clean Power Plan
(EPA)

Solar variability
and not able to
dispatch

Fossil-fuel plant
closings will
increase rates

Leasing on customerside solar

Still not cost
effective to
install roof-top
solar

New solar
organization
created to adapt
to solar
emergence

Need to
decouple
residential
rates

Two meter Residential buy
at retail rate,
GPC buys at
avoided cost.
20 yr. contracts
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100% fuel
recovery, so it’s
just a pass through
and not in our base
revenue
requirements.
The two meter
solution: Customer
buying at retail
rate, GPC doesn’t
lose revenue, no
other customers are
subsidizing.

Have a Public
Service Commission
that is supportive of
renewables and solar
in particular.
No RPS, no solar
goals, no
infringement on the
Territorial Act,
maintained the
avoided cost
methodologies

Table 15 GEMC Interview Common Issues and Response

Stakeholder
Impact

Value
Proposition
GPC funding of a
new unregulated
division that
markets and
operates solar
leasing will impact
the Co-ops
Co-ops can get into
the leasing
business for
customers in their
territory.

Co-ops considering
the two meter
design- Customer
buys at retail rate,
GEMC buys at
avoided cost.

Customer
Interface

Infrastructure

Regulatory

Customers get
into solar for
environmental
reasons,
hedging, and rate
security

Unfair costsharing

Roof-top solar
with one meter
offsets their usage
– lost revenue.

Clean Power
Plan (EPA)

Solar bills that
allow exceptions
to the CUVA
Covenants which
is the
Conservation
Use Covenants
(tax benefit)

Excess netmetering on
circuits

Fossil-fuel plant
closings will
increase rates

Leasing bill for
customer-side
solar

Still not cost
effective to
install roof-top
solar

New solar
absorbed within
existing
organization

Net-metering
aggregate limits

Solar tariff to
cover fixed
costs.

The two meter
solution:
Customer buying
at retail rate,
GEMC doesn’t
lose revenue, no
other customers
are subsidizing.

EU
Control

Avoided cost for
net-metering

Revenue

Need to
decouple
residential rates
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Have a Public
Service
Commission
that is
supportive of
renewables and
solar in
particular
No RPS, no
solar goals, no
infringement on
the Territorial
Act, and
maintained the
avoided cost
methodologies

Table 16 Duke Energy / Santee Cooper Interview Common Issues and Response

Stakeholder
Impact

Value
Proposition
IOUs must
normalize the
investment tax
credit across the
twenty year life
Solar is a threat
because in a PPA
we don’t own an
asset or get a rate of
return on it, and at
some time a PPA is
a debt on the
balance sheet
Two meter Residential buy at
retail rate, Duke
buys at avoided
cost. 20 yr.
contracts

EU
Control

Avoided cost for
net-metering

Customer
Interface
Customers get
into solar for
environmental
reasons, hedging,
and rate security

Infrastructure
Unfair costsharing

Revenue
Roof-top solar
with one meter
offsets their
usage – lost
revenue.

Regulatory
Clean Power
Plan (EPA)

Leasing bill for
customer-side
solar

Solar
variability and
not able to
dispatch

Fossil-fuel
plant closings
will increase
rates

Leasing bill for
customer-side
solar

Bill allows EUs
to offer
consumers
choices, to adopt
solar and buy it
down. Does not
disrupt our
revenue model

You decouple
your rate from
the solar such
as you’re still
meeting your
earnings as a
minimum
requirement

100% fuel
recovery, so
it’s just a pass
through and
not in our base
revenue
requirements.

Bill allows cost
recovery, a
budget, and a
directive from
the General
Assembly to
offer incentives

Solar tariff to
cover fixed
costs.

Two meter
solution:
Customer
buying at retail
rate, Duke
doesn’t lose
revenue, no
other
customers are
subsidizing.

Adapt to the
solar
environment,
operationally
and staffingwise, and Cooperate it and
make it part of
our business

There is a healthy
debate within
Duke Energy as
to whether or not
we should be in
the roof-top
business

Table 17 ECSC Interview Common Issues and Response
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Stakeholder
Impact

Value
Proposition
Must file a new net
metering tariff with
the Public Service
Commission tied to a
methodology and
system value.

Customer
Interface
Customers get
into solar for
environmental
reasons,
hedging, and
rate security

Must file a
Distributive Energy
Resource Plan that
sets cap on incentives
for solar with a 2%
peak demand limit by
2021

Leasing bill for
customer-side
solar

Two meter Residential buy at
retail rate, Co-op
buys at avoided cost.

Co-ops are in the
business of
delivering value.
One day what
we’re going to
sell will look
like energy
services or grid
services

EU
Control

Avoided cost for
one-meter netmetering

Fixed monthly
payment may be
the future just
like cell phones
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Infrastructure

Revenue

Regulatory

Unfair costsharing

Roof-top solar
with one meter
offsets their
usage – lost
revenue.

Clean Power
Plan (EPA)
will increase
transmission
rate

Co-ops do not
own any
generation
in SC, they
buy wholesale
from Duke and
Santee Cooper

Fossil-fuel plant
closings will
increase rates

Leasing bill
for customerside solar

Increase
Distribution
Services for
the customers

100% fuel
recovery, so it’s
just a pass
through and not
in our base
revenue
requirements.

SC bill allows
cost recovery,
a budget, and
a directive
from
the General
Assembly to
offer
incentives

Solar tariff to
cover fixed
costs.

Two meter
solution:
Customer
buying at retail
rate, Co-op
doesn’t lose
revenue, no
other customers
are subsidizing.

New bill
allows Co-ops
adapt to the
solar
environment

Figure 27 GPC Interview (IOU #3 - Leximancer)
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Figure 28 GPC 2009 CEO/IRP Report (IOU #3 - Leximancer)
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Figure 29 GPC 2013 CEO/IRP Report (IOU #3 - Leximancer)
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Figure 30 GEMC 2009 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #5 - Leximancer)
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Figure 31 GEMC 2013 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #5 - Leximancer)
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Figure 32 GEMC Interview (Co
(Co-Op #5 - Leximancer)
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Figure 33 Duke Energy Interview (IOU #4 - Leximancer)

Figure 34 Duke Energy 2009 CEO Report (IOU #4 - Leximancer)
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Figure 35 Duke Energy 2013 CEO Report (IOU #4 - Leximancer)
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Figure 36 ECSC Interview (Co
(Co-op #6 - Leximancer)

Figure 37 ECSC 2009 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #6 - Leximancer)
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Figure 38 ECSC 2013 CEO Report (Co
(Co-op #6 - Leximancer)

Figure 39 Santee Cooper Interview (Leximancer)
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Figure 40 Santee Cooper 2009 Report (Leximancer)
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Figure 41 Santee Cooper 2013 CEO Report (Leximancer)
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In summary, from 2009 - 2014, GPC/DUKE and GEMC/ECSC have made minimal business
model changes. The primary change was that the IOUs moved to a structural ambidextrous frame
within their corporations to manage the solar energy market. For Georgia and South Carolina, the
popularity of customer-side rooftop solar third-party leasing and ownership may grow for
residential and commercial entities upon legislation approval. The EUs are positioning
themselves for change by controlling their existing processes and structures to prepare for the
future. With the lowest rates in the U.S., the demand or need for solar PV is not as strong giving
EUs more time to prepare. At present, the drivers for solar change in this region are the EPA
Clean Power Plan and state regulatory pressures. The IOUs have changed more than the Co-ops
by restructuring departmental resources, developing solar initiatives for utility-side solar
additions, and agreeing to a solar leasing bill for customer-side roof-top customers. The primary
growth of solar is in the urban areas which allow the Co-ops, who serve rural customers, time to
align themselves to the initiatives that have been successful with GPC and Duke. Table 18
provides an overview of the federal and state credits and RPS and net-metering status.
Table 18 Georgia and South Carolina Solar Regulatory Summary from DSIRE*
1. Federal: Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit established by the Energy Policy Act of
2005 of 30% expires 12/31/2016. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) expanded by
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 of 30% reduced to 10% after 12/31/2016.
2. Net-Metering: All utilities must offer bidirectional or single directional metering to customer
generators up to 10 kW for residential and 100 kW for commercial applications. The aggregate
capacity limit is 0.2% of a utility’s peak demand from the previous year. The excess is credited
at a predetermined rate.
South Carolina: System Capacity Limit: 20 kW for residential; 1000 kW or 100% of demand
for non-residential. Aggregate Capacity Limit: 2% of average retail peak demand for previous
5 years. Net excess credited to customer's next monthly bill.

V

DISCUSSION
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V.1.1 Effects of the EU Business Model and Competing Values Framework on OA
The framing of the solar PV EU leader business model changes acts as an important guide to
help determine EU organizational ambidexterity (OA). Specifically, this researcher continues the
efforts of Richter (2011), Maitlis (2005), and Cameron (2006) by using theory elaboration to
propose a new conceptualization for determining EU organizational ambidexterity in response to
an emerging disruptive technology. Richter’s (2011) EU Business Model, Maitlis (2005)
sensemaking forms, and Cameron’s (2006) Competing Value Leadership Framework are used in
an integrated manner to determine the EU leadership behavior that affects OA decision making.
This study uses at least 55 solar energy issue domains (five business model components x 11
electric utilities) to differentiate between OA types.

Examining the interviews, CEO reports, and IRP raw data in relation to this conceptualization
leads to important findings for the first research question: How have EU business model changes
and OA behaviors helped EUs respond to a shift in their environment from 2009 - 2014 due to a
disruptive solar technology?

A description of the CVF EU leadership behaviors derived from the sensemaking forms is
necessary to reveal the extent of an EU’s organizational ambidexterity. These descriptions
indicate the emergence of four different CVF leadership behavior types that were present in
different regions of the U.S. and answer the first research question. Figures 42 through 45
graphically illustrate the CVF behavioral framework for each EU region and corresponding
organizational ambidexterity.
In the Southeast region, EU leader behavior is restricted and in the CVF “Control” quadrant due
to low stakeholder involvement and high EU leader control. However, the study shows that when
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the regulatory business model component is active, stakeholder sensegiving explanations
increase requiring EU leaders to move to the fragmented behavior which corresponds to the CVF
“Create” quadrant that is highly explorative and engaged. One important aspect of the “Create”
dimension is that when fragmented behaviors occur by EU leaders and stakeholders, structural
OA is displayed to efficiently implement innovative and visionary regulatory policies that were
approved by EUs and stakeholders thus benefitting both parties. For example, sensemaking
improved from restricted to fragmented in the CVF “Create” quadrant in Georgia when
consumers and state representatives presented a private property rights justification for rooftop
solar leasing instead of the weaker environmental benefit perspective. EU leaders recognized that
the focus on an individual’s private property rights had more judicial merit allowing a positive
climate for change with stakeholders. The regulatory catalyst for EU leader positive-opposite
behavior change can be described as utilizing “Practical Vision”. The integration of the
“Control” and “Create” quadrants can be a key to effective structural ambidextrous leadership.
Cameron (2006) points out that achieving “Practical Vision” is a product of combining optimism
and reason with a byproduct of intuition and insight. Leaders with this behavior can see realties
and practicalities as well as possibilities and prospects of the future. The integration of these two
contradictory concepts reveals a behavior that was found within the EUs in the Southeastern
region demonstrating structural ambidexterity for the IOUs and Co-ops within the urban areas.

In the Northeast region, VEC and GMP leaders are also displaying restricted and fragmented
sensemaking and together they are characterized by “Teachable Confidence”. Vermont
stakeholders are actively incorporating renewables into the state’s portfolio and VEC (Co-op)
and GMP (IOU) are not opposing this approach. EU leadership behaviors show attributes of the
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CVF “Control” quadrant (confidence and assuredness) and the CVF “Create” quadrant (openness
and teachableness). Teachable confidence is facing the unknown and continually moving
forward so as to co-create a new reality. As GMP changes from a vertically integrated IOU
model to a distributed service model, the EUs are accepting this change as a positive step toward
an effective transformation. Vermont is one of the first states taking steps to move away from the
traditional vertically integrated utility model and create a structural change towards a more
distributed service-based model. The integration of these two contradictory concepts is a key
behavior that can support effective structural ambidexterity.

In the Midwest region, Colorado is similar to other states in that the regulatory environment is
where solar issues are explained and actions are negotiated and resolved for solar PV. When EU
leaders find a balance between having patience, support, and compassion for consumers and
stakeholders and knowing when to challenge legislators, a contextual ambidextrous “Caring
Confrontation” environment emerges. When a collaborative behavior exists and high levels of
EU leader control correspond to rich explanations from the stakeholders, a guided sensemaking
form exists in the CVF “Collaborate” quadrant. The OA behavior is highly explorative,
supportive, and directive. The positive-opposite to this dimension is the CVF “Compete”
quadrant and minimal sensemaking. In this regulatory environment, misunderstandings can
create tension for both parties initiating a need for a balance between collaboration (Caring) and
competition (Confrontation). This integration of positive-opposites, or paradoxical leadership
behavior, establishes an EU leader that emphasizes the welfare of the state before personal
interests but challenges stakeholders and employees to also live up to a high standard leader
model. Cameron (2006) explains that people respond to leaders that ‘tell it like it is’, challenging
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mediocrity while practicing kindness and compassion. The integration of paradoxical leadership
behaviors reveals that the Colorado Co-ops have created a contextually ambidextrous
organizational environment to manage the regulatory impact of solar PV.

In the Pacific region, KIUC and HEI have increased their guided sensemaking from 2009 to
2014. Sensemaking solar process characteristics reveal a “Collaborate” quadrant strategy. As
Cameron (2006) explains, the prescription for organizational effectiveness in a complex,
unpredictable, and threatening business environment with hyper-turbulence is a flexible,
autonomous, self-governing workforce. KIUC and HEI also display the minimal sensemaking
form when fast change is necessary. KIUC’s collaborative strategy to empower the existing
power supply department to quickly develop a “Compete” strategy for third-party financing,
construction, and ownership of utility-side solar while maintaining the existing operations and
maintenance functions in-house reveal an “Autonomous Engagement” behavior and contextual
ambidexterity. The integration of these two contradictory concepts was shown by Hawaii’s EUs
creating a contextual ambidextrous organizational environment that identified new ways to
create organizational value.
V.1.2 Patterns that differ between IOUs and Co-ops (Refer to Table 19)
The second important finding of this study answers the research question: What are the
discernable business model patterns and OA behaviors that differ between investor-owned
(urban) and electric cooperative (rural) EUs in response to a disruptive solar technology?
This finding concerns the interaction of Richter’s (2011) business model changes between two
different EU organizational types and their ambidextrous behaviors. As each of the Competing
Values Leadership Framework (CVF) dimensions are analyzed alongside the Richter’s (2011)
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business model components, an emergence of either structural or contextual organizational
ambidexterity develops within each EU. From this analysis, each EU type (Co-op and IOU) takes
on a more specific form of organizational ambidexterity.

This study finds that within the value proposition component, the majority of the IOUs are
utilizing structural ambidexterity and Co-ops are using contextual ambidexterity. IOUs are using
structural ambidexterity for a variety of reasons. First, the IOUs serve most of urban America
where the majority of residential roof-top installations are occurring. The implications of solar
requests such as permitting, advanced land purchasing, environmental surveys, interconnection
studies, bidding contracts, design, record keeping, and stakeholder interaction create increased
time demands that cannot be met with the existing organization as was noted in the interview
with Georgia Power. Also, an investor-owned utility must coordinate and implement a PSC
approved integrated resource plan within an allotted amount of time. Finally, IOUs own most of
the fossil-fueled coal plants that are being affected by the EPA Clean Power Plan which requires
them to shift to alternative generation resources like solar. These factors led IOUs to use
structural ambidexterity.

Alternatively, Co-ops are using contextual ambidexterity. They have restrictions on resources for
solar and fewer of their customers are installing customer-side solar. Rural farmers and large
agricultural areas cannot afford the upfront capital necessary to install solar. Some customers in
rural areas have sold their land to third-party utility-side solar generation developers. The Co-ops
are utilizing existing processes and procedures to manage limited solar installations
demonstrating contextual ambidexterity.
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Within the customer interface business model component, most of the IOUs utilize structural
ambidexterity and Co-ops use contextual ambidexterity to handle the solar customer-side solar
PV market. The Pacific region offers a different perspective which shows the need for structural
ambidexterity with IOUs. In Hawaii, KIUC’s consumer retail rates have fallen significantly from
34 cents per kWh to 21 cents per kWh due to the implementation of utility-side solar and biomass plants supplanting the use of expensive oil-fired generation. Interview data in reference to
highly controversial topics like roof-top solar indicates that KIUC maintained positive customer
relations whereas HEI struggled with customer relations. Because IOUs serve more urban
customers and have the added pressures from third-party solar leasing entities, they are impacted
significantly from consumer friendly regulatory mandates like net-metering. HEI difficulty with
customer relations is due to its back-log of roof-top customer requests that have not been
processed due to operational issues and the significant presence of SolarCity pressuring
policymakers to open up the market. It appears from the data that HEI should consider moving
toward a structural framework like other large IOUs have done due to the extreme popularity of
customer-side solar within their service territory.

In reference to infrastructure, Co-ops and IOUs are using contextual ambidexterity to handle this
business model component. The emergence of solar PV has had a significant impact on
operations. IOUs are vertically integrated where they own generation, transmission, and
distribution systems requiring a stricter reliance on operational issues. The increase of
renewables on the grid has caused technical grid voltage and frequency reliability problems that
must be studied and resolved. Additional grid upgrades to resolve these issues will increase retail
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rates and exacerbate the solar cost-sharing arguments. Tri-State in Colorado states that their cross
state postage stamp transmission rate structure does not take into account the additional RPS
requirements in Colorado and causes them to overcharge other states for transmission services
and undercharge Colorado. IOUs and Co-ops are also asking for approval to decouple retail rates
into a fixed and a variable component to eliminate over charging non-solar customers and undercharging solar customers.

An unexpected finding is that VEC and GMP in Vermont are forerunners in the formation of a
distributed service model that could reduce the reliance on the transmission grid. Third-party
distribution solar gardens in Colorado and Vermont have changed the EU infrastructure business
model component as specific customers are switching to solar array service. The general opinion
of the EUs is that the EPA Clean Power Plan will force the retirement of older fossil-fueled
power plants and incentivize the need for utility-side solar plants. This will increase the
dependence on solar PV causing operational service issues and costs to increase. It is the belief
of this author that the EUs will not sacrifice reliability by significantly increasing utility-side
dependence on solar until they resolve these operational service issues. If the EPA Clean Power
Plan is not amended to allow EUs more time to incorporate technical advances (smartgrid
technology) to resolve the operational issues then solar PV growth will slow down on the utilityside forcing EPA fines and EU costs to increase. In either EPA scenario the increased EU costs
will be passed to the consumer which will create a consumer behavioral shift to install roof-top
solar PV, as solar material costs continue to decrease. The best solution is for policy-makers and
EUs to utilize guided sensemaking to develop a Collaborative / Competitive EU Competing
Values Leadership (behavioral) Framework. This behavior will enhance and incorporate a
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positive decision-making process that may include incentives and penalties as drivers for CO2
EU reduction with realistic implementation milestones.

In summary, the IOU and Co-ops are both using existing processes and procedures to plan their
transmission grids. The use of contextual ambidexterity is appropriate in this system planning
area until either the EPA Clean Power Plan regulations accentuate the need to retire fossil-fuel
power plants and increase the solar PV resource percentage to a serious operational level or
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) requires excessive EU compliance
mandates.

In relation to revenue, structural ambidexterity dominates this business model component for
both IOUs and Co-ops. The biggest difference between IOUs and Co-ops is found in relation to
revenue. IOUs are regulated by the state PSCs and guaranteed a rate that will allow recovery of
their costs through rate increases. The Co-ops do not have a guaranteed cost recovery mechanism
and are concerned that the BOD representatives, who are their customers, may disallow
additional costs for customer-side and utility-side solar. There continues to be internal EU
discussions on whether EUs should take advantage of the solar leasing market and move toward
a distribution service model. This business model component is the most volatile today in
reference to loss of market share. It typically deals with issues like solar cost-sharing, decoupling
of retail rates, and net-metering. IOUs and Co-ops have found that it is best to work together on
these issues to improve the possibility of beneficial revenue legislation.
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The regulatory model component was added because it is the foundation for the other four
components of the business model. In the U. S. most Co-ops and IOUs have their own
government relations departments to handle the lobbying and negotiations associated with
controversial revenue business model topics. So, structural ambidexterity is used in this business
model component. The regulatory component is the most active of all of the business model
components in regard to the issues of impact and the actions associated with the control of solar
PV within the EU environment. In 2009 most of the IOUs and Co-ops did not focus on solar PV
because they had strong regulatory control mechanisms in place (i.e. Territorial Act Laws) that
prevented residential consumers from leasing roof-top solar panels. However, the EU regulatory
component became a key part of the business model as the EU industry experienced a
transformation between 2009 and 2013 when federal and state government incentives were
enacted, EPA CO2 reduction mandates were approved, solar PV costs decreased and state RPS
mandates began.

Collaborate

Flexibility and Exploration (OA)
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Figure 42 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Hawaii)

Collaborate

Flexibility and Exploration (OA)

108

Create

Fragmented Sensemaking
(Low Control, High Impact)

Process Characteristics
• Long-term Change
• Teambuilder Type Leader
• Communication Value
Proposition
• Effectiveness = Employee
Development & Empowerment

Process Characteristics
• New Change
• Entrepreneur Type Leader
• Transformational Value
Proposition
• Effectiveness = Innovativeness
& Vision

Outcome: Contextual

Outcome: Structural
•
•
•

OA

Restricted Sensemaking
(High Control, Low Impact)

Minimal Sensemaking
(Low Control, Low Impact)

CT

Solar Process Characteristics
• Incremental Change
• Organizer Type Leader
• Consistency Value Proposition
• Effectiveness = Control &
Efficiency

Creating the future through
innovation
Senses, Seizes, and
Reconfigures
Behaviors: High Supportive
and Low Directive –
Supporting

(Impact)
External

•

Sustaining the organization and
its culture through stakeholder
engagement & development of
employees
Behaviors: High Supportive
and High Directive - Coaching PR

Process Characteristics:
• Fast Change
• Competitor Type Leader
• Market Share Value
Proposition
• Effectiveness = Aggressively
Competing & Customer Focus

Stakeholder Sensegiving
Low

•

Stakeholder Sensegiving
High

Guided Sensemaking
(High Control, High Impact)

Outcome: Structural
Outcome: Contextual
•

•

Operating the organization
efficiently through continuous
improvement
Behaviors: High Directive and
Low Supportive - Directing

•

•

Control

Expanding the organization
through acquiring financial
capital & attentiveness to
customers
Behaviors: Low Supportive and
Low Directive - Delegating

Control and Exploitation (OA)
EU Leader Sensegiving
High

(Control)

Compete

EU Leader Sensegiving
Low

Figure 43 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Colorado)
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Figure 44 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Vermont)
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Figure 45 OA Analysis using Sensemaking Forms and CVF for Solar PV (Georgia)

Table 19 Discernable patterns that differ and agree between a IOU and Co-op
Value Proposition

Customer Interface

Infrastructure
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This study makes three important contributions to the EU business model and to organizational
ambidexterity literature.

First, the study identifies, develops, and uses an integrative approach (tool) to assess business
model strategies and business behavior within an electric utility during the emergence of a
disruptive technology. Drawing on, extending, and organizing important ideas from the business
model explanations and narratives through sensemaking allowed the business model components
to be organized into four behavioral forms (guided, restricted, fragmented, and minimal). These
forms were then integrated into the Competing Values Leadership Framework to investigate how
electric utility leaders position their organizations to address the challenges of solar PV. This
framework is a contribution to the area of concern.

Second, the addition of a regulatory component to the EU business model was a contribution to
the conceptual thinking of the business model framework during the emergence of a disruptive
technology. It was added to Richter’s (2011) EU business model because within the U.S. there is
a strong presence of the regulatory arm. Federal and state governments have enacted rules and
defined responsibilities to ensure a clean environment. The regulatory model component
improved the EU business model interpretations of the solar PV issues that impacted the EUs
and stakeholders along with the actions to control market share. The emergence of solar PV
technology, which is becoming a cost effective energy resource for individuals and EUs, has and
will continue to disrupt the vertically integrated EU business model. The regulatory component
contribution is a critical component to influence the EUs strategy and operational decisionmaking. The differing issues and associated actions to mitigate the impact of solar emergence for
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Co-ops and IOUs are resolved through the strong presence of the regulating side of the EU
business model. Thus, the addition of a regulatory component to the EU business model is
necessary.

The third contribution is a predictive and prescriptive instrument that allows EUs an opportunity
to assess what type of ambidextrous business behavior best aligns and adapts within their EU in
the presence of a disruptive technology. Organizational ambidexterity can allow EUs to align and
adapt to the presence of a solar PV disruptive technology. By integrating the evolving EU
business model with the Competing Values Framework (CVF), a new lens is created allowing
EU Co-op and IOU organizational ambidexterity schema to become visible. The contribution
focuses on the process of collecting and using current EU issues, structural, and operational data
(through an interview process) and longitudinal CEO report data, evaluating the processes of
solar impact and organizational control (sensemaking), and then linking the commonalities to the
Competing Values Leadership Framework to determine a leadership positive-opposite behavioral
value predictive trajectory. This behavior or situational leadership style projects whether the
organizations are using contextual or structural organizational ambidexterity. This process can be
used to analyze the state of an EU and help determine a course of action.

There are a number of limitations within this study. One consideration is that the sample size was
small - 11 EUs throughout the U.S. were studied with 5 pilot interviews. These electric utilities
represent a mix of IOU and Co-op leaders that were grouped in four U.S. regions (Southeast,
Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific). This mix helped to examine and understand business model
changes and determine how organizational ambidexterity differed nationally in the presence of a
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disruptive technology. It is the belief of this author that sampling EUs within the 2013 top 10
ranked annual solar PV capacity additions in the U.S. and understanding their business model
behavioral changes in four distinct U.S. regions makes this research generalizable across other
EUs nationally. Also, there is a possibility that the four forms of EU organizational behaviors
identified here may not be an exhaustive description of the OA type or behavioral trajectories of
all EUs.
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VII IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has four important practical lessons:

The first lesson stems from the realization that IOUs or Co-ops can learn from each other. These
particular findings recognize that some EU leaders are “early adopters” and are ahead of the
disruptive technology curve. EU leaders can learn from these findings and, through sensegiving
communication with each other, can determine the Competing Values Framework that best fits
their needed behavior. For example, Georgia Power mentioned that they waited and learned from
the successes and failures of other organizations before they implemented their Advanced Solar
Initiative. This study provides an integrated approach of a predictive (CVF behavioral trajectory)
and prescriptive (integrative tool to assess business model strategies) schema necessary to
interpret how an EU’s business model is changing and to what extent it is showing ambidextrous
behaviors. This research also points to a type of core leadership behavior that is relevant to
companies who are combating a disruptive technology like solar energy. For instance, guided
and minimal sensemaking positive-opposite processes creating “Autonomous Engagement”
behaviors may be particularly valuable in a high customer interface business model component
situation that requires the development of rich, multifaceted narratives for ongoing and
spontaneous actions, such as establishing or re-writing net-metering requirements or developing
non-solar cost-sharing legislation. The cooperative KIUC on the island of Kauai in Hawaii has
led the way in this type of leadership. Its EU leaders have empowered its employees to take a
solar leadership position and reduce customer costs by half. They are truly the electric utility
“petri dish” for customer interface.
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The second practical lesson is that an EU should be open to change and have the entrepreneurial
confidence to consider changing or modifying its business model if needed. Vermont has made
that decision and is now a forerunner in the conversion from a vertically integrated EU to a
distributed service organization. The EUs in Vermont are utilizing a “Teachable Confidence” in
that their business model consists of a energy makeover consulting service to supplement lost
revenue, the installation and operation of a community distributed PV garden system, as well as
the promotion of electric vehicle charging stations. This distributed service business model is the
first step towards a distributed generation market. Many EUs have not recognized the value
proposition of this type of community service level technology for a profitable business plan.
Standardization of processes and the aggregation of volume could make this a niche market
worth pursuing.

The third lesson is that the federal and state governments are focused on developing legislation
to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel power plants, initiating the growth of renewable
resources into the EU generation mix, and thereby reducing consumer costs by opening
opportunities for third-party competition within the utility-side and customer-side solar market.
Government has little regard for variable energy resource operational issues and believes that
EUs will find technical solutions that will not increase customer rates. The legislation mandating
emission controls for EUs will change the EU business model forcing more EUs out of both the
generation market and the residential energy supply market. More cooperative EUs will likely
become distributed service entities and IOUs will create wholesale generation companies (i.e.
Southern Company subsidiary Southern Power) to compete with third-party utility-side solar and
wind generation companies across the U.S. These changes will require EUs to create a future
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through innovation, employee development, consistent incremental change, and attentiveness to
the needs of the customer. A descriptive and predictive integrative approach allows EUs to
assess their business model strategies and align and adapt their business behaviors to provide a
cost effective and reliable electrical power system through the dimensions shown in the
Competing Values Framework. The objective is to give EUs a behavioral alignment tool that is
flexible enough to make position moves ahead of the external stakeholder pressures allowing
EUs to develop organizational radar to stay ahead of the curve.

The final lesson learned from this research is that there will be operational issues associated with
variable energy resources like wind and solar as they become a part of the generation resource
mix. These operational issues will be studied by planning engineers and costly projects will have
to be incorporated into the transmission grid to relieve voltage and frequency constraints. Today,
the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) has the authority to administer compliance
standards on every corporation that generates, operates, and maintains an EU. If these standards
are not met, fines may be executed on corporations. The enforcement of these compliance
standards has increased workloads to excessive levels within EUs since 2007. The variable
energy resource (VER) expansion will force NERC to develop stringent reliability standards to
maintain the current level of reliability. This will increase costs and create additional facilities
that would not have been built with generation resources that are not dependent on wind or solar.
This additional cost will have to be absorbed by consumers or EUs. The hope and vision for the
future is that as renewable generation increases, EUs can grow and adapt in a way that reduces
consumer cost and is beneficial to their organizations and to the consumer. However, we know
that more compliance will require additional cost to develop reliability standards, but through the
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emergence of increased technology to resolve operational issues and collaborative behaviors
between the EU industry and policymakers, any substantive disruptive technology can be
incorporated into an EU business model.

The future research will include further qualitative studies with second and third tier solar ranked
states to help gain more insight and to confirm the behavioral results. Another area of future
research concerns the integration of the Maitlis four sensemaking forms with the Competing
Values Framework between organizational departments. For example, in departments where
efficient organizational processes are critical there would be more instances of restricted and
fewer instances of guided sensemaking. Changing the unit of analysis to the department could
lead to determining the ambidextrous behaviors necessary to improve efficiencies between
department efficiencies. In order to develop an understanding of organizational ambidexterity,
researchers need to acknowledge the integrative prescriptive process through the examination of
the sensemaking contextual forms most conducive to the Competing Values Framework. Finally,
a quantitative study using the same set of EU leaders could be conducted to confirm the forms of
OA in this study.
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IX APPENDIX A: EU INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
The Role of Organizational Ambidexterity in Electric Utilities in Mitigating and Embracing Solar Photovoltaic
Technology
Interview Protocol
Interview guidelines
• At the beginning of the interview, the participant will be informed about the purpose of the study.
• The oral consent of the participant will be sought before asking any questions.
Electric Utility and Executive/Manager’s background
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What is your job title and how long have you held this position?
How long has your company been in operation?
Where is your company based?
What is your service territory and annual demand?
Is your company a Cooperative, Investor-Owned, or Municipal?
Could you describe your renewable energy portfolio responsibilities?

Electric Utility Solar Energy Business Model
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Could you describe your organization’s utility-side solar photovoltaic business model? What is your present
utility-side solar PV capacity?
Could you describe your organization’s customer-side solar photovoltaic business model? What is your
present customer-side solar penetration?
Could you outline the general process you go through when initiating an RFP to install utility-side solar
options?
Could you outline the general process you go through when contacted by a consumer looking to install solar
options?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of solar energy for your electric utility?
How have you organized internally to handle the utility-side and customer-side solar PV interconnection
requests?
How have you responded to the changing landscape in terms of your attitude, and actual organizational
response? Is this question related to infrastructure?
What are your future plans for handling these requests if they increase?

Electric Utility’s Value Propositions
1.
2.
3.
4.

Could you describe how the utility-side solar PV projects provide a value to your organization?
Could you describe how the customer-side solar PV projects provide a value to your organization?
How do you adapt and change to this new solar PV disruptive technology and still balance the exploitation of
your existing resources with the exploration of new solar capabilities?
Do you provide customized solutions or energy related services for your customers? If yes, please describe.

Electric Utility’s Customer Interface
1.
2.
3.

How do you provide renewable energy to your customers with utility-side solar PV projects? How do you
inform your customers about costs?
Can you describe your community solar generation model and how your customers get involved?
How do you establish a long-term customer relationship?
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4.
5.
6.

Can you describe your Net-Metering solar program for small, medium, and large applications? How do you
inform your customers about costs?
Can you explain why some electric utilities pay solar PV consumers the retail price and some pay the
avoided energy cost for wholesale power?
How do you receive community feedback for your business services?

Electric Utility’s Infrastructure
1.
2.
3.

Can you describe how you have refined your business model framework to accept solar PV technology?
Can you compare and contrast the differences of how an urban vs. rural electric utility might approach the
changing landscape and growth of renewable solar fuel sources?
What are your solar PV operational obstacles due to the variability of cloud cover and the complications of
customer-side net metering pricing policies?

Electric Utility’s Revenue Model
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Can you describe your revenue stream through the feed-in of renewable solar energy?
Can you describe how the economies of scale from large utility-side projects provide tax credits, public
support, and/or revenue?
How do you handle the high transaction costs associated with Net-Metering, Community Solar, and utilityside third-party solar arrays?
Can you describe your customer-side energy efficiency programs, solar training services, and/or solar panel
lease plans that might counteract lost revenue?
How can you differentiate your solar energy services from other competitors like SolarCity? Explain your
utility-side solar services and customer-side solar panel leasing program, if applicable.
What is your opinion about the solar business trends and growth in your service territory in reference to lost
revenue?

Electric Utility’s Regulatory
1.
2.
3.

Can you describe how the changing regulatory environment will affect your solar PV utility-side and
customer-side business model?
Does your state have a RPS or state solar mandates? If so, please describe.
What are the regulatory obstacles for your electric utility now and in the near future?
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substations.
Managed the electric system protection department with state-of-theart substation control designs and protective relay applications.
Supervisor, Georgia Power Co., Macon, GA
Managed and coordinated the planning, execution, and
guidance of the electric utility power delivery activities.
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PROFESSIONAL

-

2014 Best Poster Award at the EDBAC (Executive Doctorate Business
Administration Conference) in Tulsa, OK
Member of IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
Graduate of Georgia Power Company’s Power Delivery Leadership
Development Program
Authored and presented a technical paper at the Georgia Tech
Protective Relay Conference
Adjunct professor at Lanier Technical College in Gainesville, GA
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